

Vietnam War - The Great Victory of Vietnamese Will and Intelligence

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Abstract: The paper presents the most crucial events when Vietnamese people had to confront and deteriorated four strategically neocolonial aggression wars under five US presidents, from Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon to Ford. It is the fierce, brave struggle that wisdom of the whole Party, army and people have been challenged, practiced thanks to following victorious factors: i) the national revolution target and determination to defeat invaders; ii) maintenance of political lines, independent military policies, autonomy, correctness and creativity of the Party; iii) Non-stop evoking the great potential of people's support, capacity and financial strength.

Key words: Vietnam War, bravery, wisdom, great victory, Vietnam.

1. Roughly four decades ago, in a major offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975, Vietnam successfully ended the resistance against the American's invasion marked by the liberation of the South and reunion of a country, facilitating to build socialism gradually.

Evaluating the event, Congress of the 4th National Party states: "Time will pass, but our victory against US is forever recorded in history as one of the most glorious pages, a bright symbol of revolutionary heroism triumph and human intelligence, the world's historic feat of the twentieth century, an event of big international importance and time" (CPV, 1976: 5,6).

That glorious victory are basic inheritance and development to a new level of patriotism, the spirit of independence, sovereignty, indomitable resilience, traditional solidarity and mettle hero, intelligence, creative talent of the nation in a few thousand years of building and defending the country that formed Vietnam's intellectual and bravery.

Bravery and wisdom were tested in the process of defeating several North feudal invasions (Politburo, 1995: 279).

2. On the basis of upholding the elite traditional values while taking advantage of all positive elements and under the leadership of Vietnam Communist Party formed by Hồ Chí Minh, Vietnam conducted the August Revolution (1945) to overthrow the colonial - feudal over 80 years and formed Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Then, Vietnam took prolonged and arduous resistance against French and US armies, marked by the victory of Điện Biên Phủ.

Điện Biên Phủ victory led to the Geneva Conference on Indochina. Geneva Agreement formally recognized the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Representatives of the US Government declared its commitment that the US would not use force to undermine agreements and the first 12

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articles of the final declaration, consistent with the United Nation Charter (Nguyễn Đình Bin, 2002: 157-160).

However, right after the Geneva Convention, the US dragged some allies to establish Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and increasingly intervened Southern Vietnam. In the context of the Cold War between the socialist and the capitalist in the world at that time, US basically plotted to destroy the patriotic movement of Southern Vietnamese people, and turned Southern Vietnam into a new colony and US military bases. US saw it as a base to attack the North Vietnam, stopped socialism in Southeast Asia, encircled and intimidated other socialist countries.

3. Five US presidents pursued that plot by four strategically neocolonialism war

- Firstly, the strategic "war on one side" of Eisenhower (7/1954 - 1960). With this strategy, the US granted weapons, money and assigned counselors to help Ngô Đình Diệm government implement brutal national policy "accuse communist, anti-communist". They dragged guillotine throughout the Southern, hunted and killed 90% of cadres and party members participated in the war against France and arrested, tortured hundred thousand suspects of supporting communist.

Overcoming difficult period, in the light of the Central Resolution 15 (Second Congress) and Third Congress Resolution of the Party, the Southern revolution moved from defense to attack. In late August 1959, Trà Bồng revolution erupted. In the early 1960, the movement aroused in Bến Tre and then quickly spread to large areas of the Southern Delta and the Central jungle.

Diệm's grassroots political systems were badly affected. In late December 1960, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was formed. Revolution movements and the introduction of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam were a fatal blow to the US strategy of "war on one side".

- Since entering the White House at the beginning of 1961, President Kennedy turned to apply strategic "special war" in South Vietnam. US supported weapons and means of modern warfare (such as helicopters, armored vehicles, napalm, toxic chemicals...), and put US military counselors directly commanded Vietnam troops. They consecutively opened operations according to Staley - Taylor plan and attempted to dominate South Vietnam in 18 months. Then, Johnson - McNamara plan intended to continue to dominate Southern Vietnam within 2 years.

The US - Diệm considered civil consolidation, establish strategic hamlets the backbone strategy of the "special war". With the motto of "slapping water, catching fish", they plotted to split the revolutionary forces out of community so that Republic of Vietnam (RV) troops operated big campaigns to destroy militia units and the main force of Southern army that was newly re-established from the Đồng khởi movement.

By applying the strategy "two feet, three directions" (two feet: combination of propaganda and military force; three directions: combination of military actions with political struggle and propaganda), people persistently tried to keep villages with the spirit "not give away an inch, nor a millimeter". At the same time, some army units of the main region, district or province in collaboration

with the militia fought many battles and destroyed some RV and US troops, for example the tactical smashing battle "helicopter", "armored" of US-RV in Ấp Bắc (1-1963) and in Bình Giã (12-1964), etc.

That "Special war" strategy fell into deadlock forced the US to replace personnel. They created favorable condition for some young generals to overthrow and murdered Diệm – Nhu brothers (November 1963), pushed RV fell into chronic crisis: Within 18 months, more than 10 coups and counter-coups consecutively erupted. The coup of June 1965 put Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to get power.

To save the situation, The US President Johnson was forced to move from "special war" to "local war" strategy. Deploying this strategy, the Pentagon put hundred thousands of American Expeditionary Force with the military of some vassal countries into the South Vietnam to urgently help Thiệu's government build and consolidate all RV arms. According to statistics, the American Expeditionary Force presented in South Vietnam from 18,000 people in April 1965, 181,000 in December 1965, 376,000 in December 1966, 480,000 in December 1967, and 543,000 in April 1968. With these army forces, Johnson appointed the 4-star General - Westmoreland to direct the campaign "search and destroy" the revolutionary forces in the South Vietnam. Meanwhile, Johnson ordered blatantly war to destroy the North primarily by the US Air Force and Navy.

Responding to divine calling of President Hồ Chí Minh "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom", North Vietnam forces smashed the strategic counter

attack of Westmoreland in two dry seasons 1965-1966 and 1966-1967, dropped more than 1,000 American aircrafts in Northern Vietnam. Amid the peak of the war, the Party advocated opening the general offensive and uprising in 1968 Lunar New Year - a big blow to the US. Resounding victory of the general offensive and uprising 1968 Lunar New Year completely destroyed "local war" strategy of US army.

But the stubborn US imperialists were not doomed to failure. In the early 1969, after being elected President of the United States, Nixon advocated to implement "Vietnamization war" strategy. In essence, this is the strategy of urging Vietnamese to beat their counterparts.

Against this new war strategy of the US, North Vietnam army closely coordinated with the struggle of Laos and Cambodia inflicted heavy attacks in the Eastern - Northern Cambodia Front (1970) and Route 9 Front - Southern Laos (1971). Then, using offensive strategy in 1972, North Vietnam army broke many defenses of RV troops in Quảng Trị province, Central Highlands and Southeast. In particular, the victory of North Vietnam army smashed US strategy using B52 plane bombing Hanoi, Hải Phòng in December 1972 finally forced Nixon - Kissinger to sign the Paris Agreement on Vietnam and withdraw US military out of Vietnam.

Paris Agreement on Vietnam (27 January 1973) was a major victory for North Vietnam. But Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's government systematically undermined by mass squatters, residents of multiple RV army units equipped by the US before they withdrew

all its troops. In 1973, US military aided RV army 2, 670 billion USD, 700 planes, 500 cannons, 400 tanks, armored vehicles, and 2 million tons of war material reserves.

Assessing US - Thiệu's plot, Plenum 21 (July 1973) advocated to resolutely using military, political, diplomatic resources to perform a counter attack for the eventual victory, no matter what the circumstances were.

In 1973 and 1974, from the battles in the Southwest region to Phước Long liberation, the outcome of the Southern war increasingly favored North Vietnam forces. Politburo Congress (October 1974) and expanded Politburo Congress (January 1975) determined to strategically liberated the south, defeated US led troops by total offensive and uprising in the spring of 1975 (CPV, 1976: 19).

4. It can be seen that twenty one years against four war strategy of aggression under neocolonialism of America is the biggest challenge, most fierce for Vietnam.

US army mobilized into Vietnam war, at peak, an expeditionary force of over 600,000 soldiers, and over 1 million RV troops. Totally, they spent \$352 billion (Stevens, 1976) dragged over 7 million tons of bombs to Vietnam (3.5 times of bombs that the US and its allies used in Europe during Second World War), sprayed 75.8 million liters of dioxin, performed blockade strangling, devastated economy, massacred people, destroyed environment that left serious consequences for many Vietnamese generations. The White House and Pentagon commanded strategists considered "the electronic brain" and veteran generals to fight North Vietnam forces.

Thus Vietnam became a place as "battle between the right and the wrong, between civilization and savagery" (Hồ Chí Minh, 1995: 373-374). "Gold tried fire", the fierce struggle was not only a formidable challenge but also an occasion to practice the bravery and wisdom of the whole Party, army and people. That bravery and wisdom can be seen on the following key aspects:

Firstly, it was because of Vietnam justice, determination and will to dare to win the US troops. With views of a genius revolutionary leader, President Hồ Chí Minh early indicated the involvement and intervention of the US to Vietnam struggle against the French. According to General Võ Nguyên Giáp, right after the Điện Biên Phủ great victory, President Hồ Chí Minh sent officers and soldiers a letter of commendation, which he noted at the end: "The victory is big but it is just a new start ... "(Võ Nguyên Giáp, 2004: 319). Plenum 6 (7-1954) was planned before the Geneva Agreement a few days, President Hồ Chí Minh and the Party determined that "US imperialism is becoming the direct enemy of Indochina people" (Politburo, 1995: 117).

Based on this recognition, President Hồ Chí Minh and the Party focused on educated and retrained the entire army and people with the spirit to dare to win the US invaders. The indomitable spirit associated with strategic decisions to win every aggressor has been a long tradition of Vietnam.

It is the will and spirit of the legendary hero Thánh Gióng, or Triệu Trinh Nương's manner when she prepared to fight against Northern feudal: "I want to ride strong wind, kick rough waves, slice orca in the

sea, chase Wu troops, regain our country, but slave for invaders "(VASS, 1971: 109). These are the words that Trần Quốc Tuấn submitted: "His Majesty, please behead me before surrendering enemy" when Father King Trần Thánh Tông pretended: "The enemy is so strong, we have to surrender" (VASS, 1993: 81). That is the sustainable belief of King Quang Trung when he traveled from Phú Xuân to Thăng Long to expel more than 20,000 Qing troops: "Beat them to write new chapter of Vietnam history" (VASS, 1993: 353), etc.

Preparing for the August 1945 Revolution, Vietnam assumed that opportunity had arrived, so Vietnam had to win and regain independence (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 1994: 196). That spirit in the war against France during 1946-1954 was rather "sacrificing all than losing sovereignty and becoming slaves" (Hồ Chí Minh, 1995, Vol 4: 480). President Hồ Chí Minh summoned special Political Congress (March 1964), upheld the justness and affirmed the determination to defeat any conspiracy and act of US aggression.

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Earlier, in the Remarks at the sixth session of the second National Assembly of

Vietnam Democratic Republic (May 8th, 1963), President Hồ Chí Minh had publicly challenged President Kennedy to answer three questions, following is one of them: "In 1954, as a delegate of the US Congress, you criticized President Eisenhower that throwing money, weapons and soldiers into the mountainous area of Indochina without any hope of victory, it could be a dangerous thing, an act of suicide ... You believed that there was no need to support to strengthen US military in Indochina to defeat an anonymous enemy. Why is President Kennedy act so dull, in contrast to what Senate Kennedy warned wisely?" (Hồ Chí Minh, 1995, Vol 11: 62, 63).

Absolutely President Kennedy did not answer the questions, and President Hồ Chí Minh remarked: "President Kennedy should understand history, which proves that a nation united struggle for independence and freedom like your ancestors and Vietnamese people today will definitely win" (Hồ Chí Minh, 1995, Vol. 11: 62, 63).

After President Kennedy assassination in November 1963, President Johnson continued implementing the "special war" strategy. When it did not work, he sent US expeditionary military and vassal to conduct "local war" in the South of Vietnam, while the Air Force and the US Navy raided bombs on Northern Vietnam.

People in the US and around the world denounced and demanded Washington stop the war of aggression in Vietnam. In response, Johnson argued that the US sent troops into Southern Vietnam to implement commitments to its allies, and American bombing the Northern Vietnam was just

retaliation the North invasion to the South. He also wished to settle peace quickly and negotiate unconditionally (Johnson, 1965).

Exposing the deceitful peace rhetoric of Johnson, President Hồ Chí Minh argued that US imperialists were both aggressors and brazenly slandered that the North invaded the South, they intentionally breached Geneva Agreement by sending troops to Vietnam to kill and arson but they blatantly declared the desire restoring peace and protecting the Geneva Agreement "(Hồ Chí Minh, 1995, Vol.11: 432). President Hồ Chí Minh confirmed the consistent stance of Government of Democratic Republic of Vietnam to resolutely defend the sacred independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam (Hồ Chí Minh, 1995, Vol.11: 433).

For several years (1965-1967), before escalating war, Johnson regularly claimed campaign to seek peace, notably Pinta peace campaign on the occasion of Christmas 1965. Washington offered 14 point peace request, which US held on to demand the North stop invading the South, mutual military withdrawal, unconditional negotiations. They also lobbied diplomats, scientists, journalists urged Hanoi to close the deal with the US. In early 1967, The United States Department of State assigned two American journalists - Ashmore and Baggs to Vietnam and received by President Hồ Chí Minh. They suggested two sides negotiate to end the war, and President Hồ Chí Minh replied that Vietnam was in peace when US came, so why we have to pay for their stop bombing, the way they act like a robber

makes a robbery and requires the host pay the ransom. We learned a lesson that for thousand year history, we have been patriots, rational thinkers and peace lovers. We want to end this war, but the independence of Vietnam should never be brought to bargain again ... "(Luu Văn Lợi và Nguyễn Anh Vũ, 1990: 197-198). President Hồ Chí Minh showed respect to American people, who were smart, loved peace and democracy but US troops were pushed into Vietnam to kill and to be killed; otherwise, they would be welcome if they go to Vietnam as technicians (Luu Văn Lợi and Nguyễn Anh Vũ, 1990: 201-202).

But President Hồ Chí Minh's words made no impact on changing Johnson mind. Not until the general offensive and uprising 1968 lunar New Year did the approach of the White House and the Pentagon swing. General Westmoreland was recalled, Secretary of Defense McNamara resigned, President Johnson declared a unilateral bombing cease in Northern Vietnam from latitude 20, agreed to negotiate with North Vietnam and would not seek second presidential candidacy.

By early November 1963, Washington was forced to unconditionally terminate bombing and shelling on the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. But more than one million US troops, RV soldiers and military vassals continued to cause countless battles against the Southern people. Under these circumstances, on November 3rd, President Hồ Chí Minh called to fight invaders until the last went out (Hồ Chí Minh, 1996, Vol 12: 407).

Second, it is the Communist political policies, military independence, autonomy, correctness and creativity

Coping with the richest, most powerful, most brutal and sinister empire at the time, the will to dare and victory determination of Vietnam was obviously important factors. However, that is just necessary but not a sufficient condition. It is the Party's politics, military, independence, autonomy and creativity that count.

That is the way of a single ruling party at the same time upholds both ideologies of national independence and socialism, conducting national and democratic revolution in the South and socialism revolution in the North to the common goal of national reunification. That policy clearly indicates the relationship between two areas: Conducting socialist revolution in the North is the most crucial tasks for the development of the entire national revolutionary and unity; promoting democratic national revolutionary in the South was crucial in liberating the South, making national reunification (CPV, 1960: 33, 34).

This was a general methodology set by the Third Congress. It was constantly added, specified, flexibly applied and objectively assessed transformation of both forces in all fields, in each phase and at each critical strategic areas. Under that general way, the Southern Party Committee, the Central Bureau and Regional Committee, Provincial Committee led the Southern people overcome difficulties in the first 3 to 4 years of the "war on one side " to regain control of 1,100 / 1,296 communes with 4.5

million people in the Southern Vietnam and 4,440 / 4,700 villages with 2 million people in Region V (Politburo, 1995: 311). The joining of female soldiers in Bến Tre movement later spread to many other places was the eloquent expression of unyielding bravery and wisdom of Southern women. Based on the success of the Đồng khởi movement, the National Liberation Front and the Southern Liberation Army was formed, it marked the critical changes in the position and strength of the Southern revolution.

Timely summarizing various practical experiences of the Southerners in the Đồng khởi movement, the Party generalized, enriched and enhanced consistent strategies thought of the war. They were mobilizing and organizing the entire people to fight based on two forces (political propaganda and people's army forces), conducting partial revolutionary in rural areas and from uprising evolved into revolutionary war; combining military struggle with political struggle and diplomatic struggle; combining rebel and attack, attack and insurrection; hitting the enemy across three strategic areas: the mountainous, rural and urban plain with the three-pronged: military, political, and military propaganda; combining three forces: the regular army, the local army and militia; combining guerrilla warfare with regular warfare, combining big, medium and small battles; killing enemy to control situation; mastering long term strategic reviews, and creating opportunities to gradually fight back, step by step, implementing general offensive and uprising to win the final victory (CPV, 1976: 25,26).

Because of that general offensive strategy, "special war" and "local war" strategies became a failure which forced US try to settle the case in Paris.

The resistance against the US saw battles outburst while negotiations moved on (1969 - early 1973). During this period, the US tried to exploit the conflict between the two major socialist countries by compromising with China and moderating with the Soviet Union to make pressure on North Vietnam. President Hồ Chí Minh and Politburo directed the negotiation with the US to promote victory and proactive situation, attacked a down enemy, enlisted the sympathy and support of progressive people in the world including American people, grasped the opportunity in collaboration with the military and political offensive, maintained principle, applied smart tactics firmly and flexibly, forced the US to withdraw and accepted a political solution to meet basic requirements (Hồng Hà, 1999: 36, 37).

Paris Agreement was signed on January 27th 1973, after 4 years and 9 months of arduous negotiations marked with the complete failure of the bombing Hanoi 1972, the event that a study of Cornell University (USA) considers an unparalleled example of human mind triumph against machinery. Some of key articles are: "The United States and other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam" (Article 1); "The US withdraw troops, military advisers and military personnel from Southern Vietnam within 60 days..." (Article 5);

"Issues of Vietnam army forces in the Southern would be mutually resolved..." (Article 13) (MFA, 2004: 481-494). The US army was pulled out while Northern troops stayed. It was one of the biggest Vietnam diplomatic advances associated with military and political propaganda.

Paris Agreement forced US troops to withdraw from South Vietnam, it created new balances for the North Vietnam moved on to the final victory, as forecast in President Hồ Chí Minh's 1969 New Year poem. In the next few years, US economy suffered recession; President Nixon faced criminal charges and resigned as consequences of Watergate. The Vice President G. Ford became the President of the United States, and the US Senate passed a resolution of limiting president powers four times during his presidency.

In this context, Washington wanted to maintain South Vietnam existing situation. But Thiệu government aggressively carried army campaigns to restore the territory controlled by Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (established on June 6th 1969), with the hope that US would continue to support and even intervene again.

Politburo Congress in October 1974 and early 1975 timely assessed the military balance, pointed out historic opportunities and determined to end the war in two years - 1975 and 1976 to unite the nation. The Politburo also proposed to liberate the South if any chances appeared at the beginning or end of 1975 (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 2000: 170). In reality, under the wise

and sensible direction of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission, together with the overwhelming military and political power, North Vietnam gained the victory in the General offensive and uprising spring 1975 in just over 55 days by three key battles: first, Buôn Mê Thuật battle to complete control the Central Highlands; second, Huế - Đà Nẵng field to restore Huế - Đà Nẵng, central coastal provinces, and also the Spratly islands held by Sài Gòn military; the final battle was the Hồ Chí Minh campaign to liberate Sài Gòn - Gia Định and the remaining provinces of the South. It could be said that revolution and military thoughts of President Hồ Chí Minh supported complete victory for national liberation (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 2000: 343). Some American politicians, such as Senator W. Fulbright and F. Church also admitted that the communist leaders truly the architect of Vietnam national independence"(W. Fulbright, 1971:55).

Generally, resounding victory of the war is heroism resilience and creative intelligence of the entire Party, army and people. In addition to the two particularly important role factors mentioned above, the most fundamental factors are the people's heart, strength and resources.

In the wills of the year 1300, Trần Hưng Đạo told King Trần Anh Tông the fundamental causes of defeating Yuan army three times were all people contributed, all became soldiers (VASS, 1993, Vol. 2: 79). In *Bình Ngô đại cáo* in the 15th century, Nguyễn Trãi concluded that the first successful lesson of the Lam Sơn uprising was:

"Raising the revolution flag and gather people" (Nguyễn Trãi, 1976:79).

Inheriting the elite military ideology of the nation while creatively absorbing and applying the Marxism - Leninism views on the decisive role of the people in history, Hồ Chí Minh confirmed: "People are very smart, enthusiastic, heroic... Having people support, everything can be done. Without their support, nothing can be achieved" (Hồ Chí Minh, 1995, Vol.5: 293). That is the reason while the war against the US became increasingly fierce, President Hồ Chí Minh organized Special Politburo Congress to unify, highlight people willpower and determination to gain final victory. It was the first time that the enormous potential of people's heart, strength and resources had promoted so strongly.

In both the South and the North, there were many movements assigned, which emerged many good symbols of patriotism, such as Tạ Thị Kiều (Mỏ Cày, Bến Tre) hid and fed communist personnel in her house, and organized and participated in 107 direct political struggle that forced the barbaric raid stopped. Đặng Thùy Trâm (Hanoi), shortly after graduating from Hanoi Medical University volunteered to work in the Southern Vietnam front. She was assigned to work in Đức Phổ hospital, Quảng Ngãi province; she devoted to relieve soldiers and treated wounded people. On 22 June, 1970 she confronted with 120 troops to get her colleagues enough time carrying out wounded soldiers into the woods, finally she died. 35 years later, American reconnaissance soldier Robert Whitehurst

who preserved the Diary of Đặng Thùy Trâm wrote to her mother: "Your daughter was alone fighting with 120 US soldiers to protect her friends. In any country, she deserved heroine" (Đặng Thùy Trâm, 2005: 167, 261).

Obviously, there were countless anonymous heroes in this time. Millions of families sent their sons, daughters to the front, and some suffered from 2 to 6 martyrs. Significantly, Nguyễn Thị Thứ (Điện Bàn, Quảng Nam) sent all her 9 children, one son in law, two nephews serving in the two wars. Hoàng Văn Phàng (Quảng Tiến, Quảng Bình) sent the eldest son to fight against the French, and the rest 6 against the US. He simply said that if US brought more troops to Vietnam, he would send more people to the front.

Thanks to these support and contribution from million families that Party and Government had enough forces to organize and deploy all warfare against the US. The creation of Hồ Chí Minh land and sea roads was the typical example. From the first secret path, in 16 years (1959-1975), the army and the youth volunteers in the military transport service built a 16,790 kilometer motor vehicle road system, with 6 vertical axes in both the East and West of Trường Sơn, connecting the North with large frontline battlefields in the South. Later, an oil and gas pipeline network with 1,399 km long was built (Politburo, 1995: 224-225).

On the basis of mobilizing all necessary force of Northern people in two years 1974-1975 carrying mainly through the Trường Sơn road system, the large rear granted

264,000 troops and a large amount of war materials with nearly 500 thousand tons including weapons, fuel, food and medicine for the battlefield (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 2000: 151). Combining with Southern local forces after two victories of liberating the Central Highlands and Huế - Đà Nẵng, four North corps, many divisions, major brigades changed from quick, sudden, courage, safe attack approach to rush to fight and get triumph" (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 2000: 285-286). And the strategy was successful at 11 hours 30 minutes on 30 April, 1975.

Twenty two years later in a meeting between General Võ Nguyên Giáp and former United States Secretary of Defense McNamara in Hanoi, answering the question which General that he appreciated most, General Võ Nguyên Giáp replied that it was People General (Dương Trung Quốc (2013: 407).

In summary, three factors demonstrated Vietnamese's bravery and wisdom are the basic lessons and decisive means for victory of the war. There are more new challenges that Vietnam has been facing, so all need to inherit and develop the past lessons to firmly safeguard the independence, unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the sea islands of the country and facilitate implementing national industrialization and modernization under the socialist orientation of rich people, strong country, democracy, justice, civilization.

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