

Political Ideology and Innovation Introduction: the Eastern and Western Paths

Ý thức hệ chính trị và ứng dụng đổi mới sáng tạo: Con đường của Phương Tây và Phương Đông

Ngày nay, Nga đang đứng trước những thách thức lớn hơn bao giờ hết, đó là đưa đất nước trở thành một trong những cường quốc lớn nhất trên thế giới. Nước Nga ý thức được rằng, để thực hiện mục tiêu này, ngoài cách thức truyền thống, họ còn cần phải phát triển khoa học kỹ thuật và đổi mới sáng tạo để đưa đất nước phát triển bền vững. Quá trình phát triển theo hướng đổi mới sáng tạo ở Nga đã bắt đầu từ năm 2005, tuy nhiên quá trình này cho đến nay vẫn chưa được vận hành một cách hợp lý. Điểm mấu chốt ở đây chính là khó khăn trong việc lựa chọn ý thức hệ và chuẩn mực chính trị để hỗ trợ cho quá trình phát triển theo hướng đổi mới sáng tạo này. Bài viết này tập trung vào việc phân tích các điểm mạnh và điểm yếu trong các thông lệ quốc tế tốt nhất về phát triển theo hướng đổi mới sáng tạo và ý thức hệ chính trị tiếp thu được trong quá trình cải cách tương tự như ở Nga hiện nay để từ đó tham khảo áp dụng trên cơ sở các đặc thù riêng về chính trị, kinh tế xã hội của Nga.

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Today the Russian public discusses which path of political and economic modernization the country needs to ensure its competitiveness at the present stage of development. A new industrialization project, transport route development and the Russian international financial center formation are the development options offered to get rid of the raw materials base of the Russian economy and statehood. However, there is a general need for a national innovative development path that can become not only a tactic, backup project but also a guarantee for a national political and economic breakthrough to the top of the world. Both the general public and the members of the establishment are united in their desire to put the Russian Federation on the same level with the most developed and advanced countries in the world.

Changes in the quantitative parameters and quality of life in the late 1990-s – beginning of the 2000-s actually made the world's leading countries make a choice between modernizing their economies following an innovative path or losing their place in the global 'major league'.

By tradition, the state acted as the key driver of reform in Russia by identifying the main areas to be reformed, allocating solid funds and building the necessary infrastructure (i. e. special economic zones, state-funded corporations, science parks, business incubators, Agency for Strategic Initiatives, etc.) The national innovation development process in pilot testing mode was launched in 2005 when Deposit Insurance Agency, the first state-funded corporation, was founded. The process virtually acquired the status of a national idea in 2008. For example, Dmitry Medvedev mentioned the policy of four i's during his presidential campaign, and one of the i's stood for an innovation [1].

However, an innovative development mechanism has not started functioning properly yet [2]. There are certainly fairly good objective and subjective reasons for this. To a large extent, the issues of this sort arise because of the difficulties in choosing the ideology and political benchmarks to back the Russian innovative

development path. It is those that determine the national innovative modernization model character for the most part. In order to determine the ideology of the innovation introduction process, it is important to examine the international best practices gained during similar reforms and, on the one hand, identify the strength and weakness in them, and, on the other hand, to assess whether they could be adjusted to be used in Russia where we have our own political, social and economic specifics.

Western Countries' (American and European) Innovative Development Model: The Political and Economic Implications

A declaration of the need for an innovative project is primarily a political choice of the countries that want to take part in the international competition and aspire for regional or global leadership. It has been believed for long that only those countries that adhere to the 'correct' liberal and democratic political course and to the market economy development pattern have a monopoly on progress and intensive development.

The concept of progress and advanced development is at the very foundations of the Western civilization. From the very beginning, the leading Western countries' political culture has been proclaiming the need to ensure that people live their lives in the most comfortable way. It did so even during the times when the world was dominated by the religious paradigm, and the Church was a powerful political force.

A similar approach has largely formed the basis of the Western policy of many years to ensure faster growth and the global leadership. Moreover, such an attitude entails a concept of the progressive, civilizing mission of the Western world in its interaction with the external environment and other civilization types. It recognizes the linear historical progress only based primarily on the fast political, economic and technological development concept. Hence, all the other (spiritual, cultural, etc.) concepts underlying the idea of progress are either discarded or considered to be derivative or rejected alto-



gether. Accordingly, the non-Western countries and peoples could only have the right to use the ‘flying geese pattern of development’, and they should follow the development path made by the leading Western countries and use the ‘templates’ that have already been ‘approved’ by them. The Western world has gradually added the concept of political progress to the original economic ‘snobbish’ attitude. Again, the Western countries claimed they were the global leaders and trendsetters here. All the other political development paths were regarded as ‘unacceptable’ and ‘non-genuine’.

Nevertheless, the developments of the early 21st century put such assumptions in disrepute. Firstly, it turned out that the liberal democratic way of development was not a universal one and was fraught with significant risks, especially for non-Western countries. Secondly, the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2010 questioned both the universalism of liberal market key principles the modern Western world was based upon and such basic principles of capitalism as competition, free market, laissez-faire practices, etc. Moreover, it can be that we are now facing a new stage of the Western economic model crisis. It might even be the beginning of a new Great Depression [3]. If so, the issue of finding a good replacement for outdated Western world paradigms will undoubtedly become more pressing.

At the same time, the loss of a single world leader questions the Western civilization’s foundations and leads to a sharply aggravated controversy between the U.S. and the EU given that it is largely the strategy of progress that allows one to maintain stability on those territories and to ensure that people are united around their governments.

For the people of the United States, being a global political, military, and economic leader is a matter of priority. In theory, Ira L. Strauss, a well-known American political scientist, former executive director (1985 - 1991) of the Association to Unite the Democracies, reflected those attitudes in the 1990s by in his concept of uni-

polarity [4]. According to him, the international system has been unipolar since the date when the Soviet pole in a bipolar world collapsed. There is in fact a unipole that consists of democratic industrialized countries which have superior weight in the global system. The United States, in its turn, are the superpower in that unipole [5].

Today the U.S. government supports technology development merely in order to maintain its competitive position on the international technology market. Not much attention is paid to the innovative SME development and the basic tools used by the policy makers in the area of science and technology are as follows:

1. Public innovative project assessment aimed at estimating the possible benefits to be gained on an economy-wide scale;
2. Government participation in financing large-scale projects (worth USD 300-500 mln.), including a 100% public funding of the most efficient science-intensive research projects;
3. Incentivizing the venture capital funds formation through partial or complete funding of the most efficient research centers and venture capital firms during the initial period;
4. Setting stricter antitrust requirements to the firms that hinder competition in science-intensive sectors.

Despite the national implementation specifics, the European innovative project has one common component. Innovations here primarily serve to smooth political and social contradictions and to ensure efficient government control over the community members via indirect mechanisms (e. g. through socially oriented political course). Moreover, today innovative development is the main guarantee of the consumer society prosperity in the leading EU member states. Only innovative development can guarantee that the ever-growing citizens’ needs and demands will be expressed and met appropriately. Thus, if not for an innovative breakthrough, political stability in Europe would have been questionable, the society would have found itself in a situation of permanent disunity and conflict, and the governments would have lost their power of political



and economic influence, hence the focus on the innovative strategy implementation in the ‘core’ EU countries.

Despite the challenges, the scientific and technological progress, while taking many factors into account, led to the emergence of a post-industrial state in the Western European and other developed countries. Such a state is characterized by the following: the rule of law, open economy, environmental regulation compliance, large-scale penetration of IT within the community, constant improvement in quality of life, pursuit of a healthy lifestyle, protection of everyone’s interests, and civil solidarity. The development of science is also regarded as one of the core values on a national scale [6].

Unlike the U.S. and other countries (e. g. UK, Japan) which are geographically isolated from other states, the European Union countries are adjacent to each other and have had to cooperate closely from the very beginning. In addition, their territories are small. They have limited natural resources and budgets that do not allow them to implement publicly-funded projects on a large scale. This has forced the national governments to move towards a maximally optimized use of the research potential available and to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation with the neighbors. Despite the fact that the countries have different purposes (for example, it is a priority for France to create jobs and for Germany to develop advanced technologies), methods used by the innovative policy makers are quite similar, and according to European experts, their efficiency is virtually the same too.

Modern Non-Western Innovative Development Practices: a Synthesis of the Universal and the National

The ‘liberal’ interpretations of the concept of an innovation and of the mechanisms that help introduce it have been called into question in recent decades. In addition to the above-mentioned crisis manifestations, we can see that ‘the third world’ countries are increasingly willing to participate in resolving the issues that are on today’s ‘progressive’ agenda, and their will

is backed up with their innovative achievement. This is true for the countries that have been merely the world periphery countries recently. Nobody would even hypothetically regard them as the countries which are capable of competing with global leaders, namely the U. S. A. and European countries. Despite the fact that their choice of innovative development path is chiefly political, their motivation may vary significantly.

Some of the new emerging countries see this transition to an innovative development track as the only chance to surpass the solid opponents in the ever so fierce international competition. A typical example of this is China. Having made an innovative breakthrough in the late 20th century, it has already left the European Union behind in terms of its military, political and economic power, and it is close on the heels of the United States [7].

Given that China does not hide its aspirations to global leadership and has been proactive in promoting its national interests in virtually all the regions of the world, an innovative agenda gives Beijing an opportunity not only to ‘build on weight’ on an international arena and build up its resource potential, but also to present to the non-Western countries in the best way possible an attractive traditions-based model of success that does not imply total destruction of the political and economic system.

The choice of ideology and innovative development strategy in China is also a rather important issue. Following lengthy discussions, the Chinese establishment members have managed to reach an agreement about the guiding principles that, on the one hand, help carry out reforms, and, on the other hand, preserve the foundations of the state and the society. This is how the concept of new authoritarianism, or neo-authoritarianism (Xin quanwei zhuyi) was formed. Its main point is that a market economy and political democracy should ‘ripen’ gradually under the supervision of a strong and tough government that is, at the same time, modernization-oriented. The concept’s supporters insisted that the new authoritarianism was fundamentally



different from the old one. According to them, the old concept of authoritarianism describes a closed cycle-based regime where the strong power gradually erodes and collapses because of the growing economic and social controversies, the riots and chaos follow, the rioters are suppressed by the new strong government, etc. In contrast, neo-authoritarianism aims at not preserving the status quo but at the dynamic social development.

There is one more incentive for the innovative development here. It is the desire of some countries to ensure the national social and political stability primarily by countering chronic poverty of the majority of the countries' population. This is particularly true for Brazil, India and Malaysia where innovative projects are generally community-oriented. However, it does not rule out the aspirations to regional leadership and participation in global alliances seen as an alternative to the Western associations (e. g. BRICS).

For some countries, innovation-based modernization is now key to survival and success in the regional competitive environment. This is true for, South Korea and Singapore, for instance. According to some analysts, Asia-Pacific region will gradually become the main trendsetter in politics and economics in the 21st century. We already can see that fierce competition is underway in the region. Under such circumstances, only an innovative breakthrough can help the country maintain its position and eventually defeat the enemies. This was clearly demonstrated by Singapore where accelerated modernization had helped improve the country's status dramatically and had helped the country gain significant economic and political advantage in the Asia-Pacific region. As for South Korea, the regional competition here is complemented with a competition of political systems. The Republic of Korea has been in a state of 'cold war' with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 1953. Its government has to regularly demonstrate achievement and ensure a constant increase in the living standards to gain support of the population.

It is worth stressing that for the most part the above-mentioned non-Western innovative modernization models are implemented under either undemocratic/authoritarian or partially democratic political regimes. The engine of progress here is primarily the government that launches and controls the reform implementation process, and not the private businesses as in Western countries. This is especially true for China, Singapore and South Korea, and it is to a lesser extent true for India and Brazil.

From the viewpoint of the community and the government, an attractive specific feature of the innovative development 'alternative' path is the fact that modernization in this case does not mean rejection of the national traditions and adjustment to Western 'quality standards'. As experience has shown, rigid adherence to American and European standards does not always ensure political, social and economic 'breakthroughs' in the countries where 'reflected modernization' is implemented. Japan is the only exception to the rule, although the national specific features have a considerable impact here too. Moreover, this dependence on foreign influence often puts the countries 'to be adjusted' in a subordinate position in relation to the 'curators' and virtually rules out the possibility of selecting independent development path.

As for Russia, it seems the country occupies the middle position. On the one hand, when using the innovative development models, the Russian government uses the experience gained by Europe and the USA where high technology and the creative class are in focus, on the other hand, when the innovative development is hampered, inflexible and even authoritarian methods of reform become quite popular. The goal of innovative modernization in Russia coincides with that of U.S. and China, the countries that differ from one another in so many ways, and the goal is the global leadership. At the same time, by stressing the need for the innovative modernization, the Russian establishment would like to become attractive primarily to the post-Soviet states with a view to form a political and economic union



under a Russian umbrella later on. ■

Footnotes

1. *Izvestia newspaper*, February 18, 2008.
2. <http://www.online812.ru/2012/03/28/001/>
3. <http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/09/29/how-to-stop-a-second-great-depression/?Authorised=false>
4. Cf.: Straus, Ira L. *Unipolarity: The Concentric Structure of the New World Order and the Position of Russia // Cosmopolis*, 1997. Issue 2. Pp. 78-91.
5. *Ibid.* p. 78.
6. Granberg, A. G. et al. *Problemy I Perspektivy Tekhnologicheskogo Obnovleniya Rossiyskoi Ekonomiki (Issues and Prospects of Technological Renovation of the Russian Economy)*, a collective monograph / Ed. by: V. V. Ivanter, N. I. Komkov, Moscow: MAKS Press, 2007, p. 59.
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3. *Innovatsionnoye Razvitiye Rossii; Problemy I Resheniya (Innovative Development of Russia: Issues and Solutions)*, monograph / group of authors, ed. by M. A. Eskinarov, S. N. Silvestrov, Moscow, Ankil, 2013, p. 1216
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5. Sigov, Yu. *Singapur. Vosmoye Chudo Sveta (Singapore: The Eighth Wonder of the World)*, Moscow, 2012. P. 336.
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7. Fedorovsky A. N. *Fenomen Chebol: Gosudarstvo I Krupny Biznes v Respublike Koreya (Chaebol Phenomenon: the Government and the Big Business in the Republic of Korea)*, Moscow, 2008. P. 320.
8. Fedotov V. G. *Neklassicheskaya Modernizatsiya I Alternativy Modernizatsionnoy Teorii (Nonclassical*

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4. - Nguyễn Quang Quỳnh và Nguyễn Thị Phương Hoa (2008) *Giáo trình Lý thuyết kiểm toán*, NXB Tài Chính, Hà Nội.
5. Nguyễn Thị Phương Hoa (2011), *Hoạt động kiểm toán với phát triển kinh tế của Lào, Kỳ yếu Hội thảo khoa học quốc tế “Phát triển kinh tế xã hội Việt Nam và Lào giai đoạn 2011-2020” tại Viêng Chăn, CHDCND Lào, Tập 1, Trang 501-507.*
6. Syviengxay Oraboune (2010) *Lao PDR and its Development Partners in Asia*, có tại: http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Brc/pdf/01_laopdr.pdf

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hàng cho khách hàng mà không yêu cầu trình vận đơn gốc. Người nhận hàng muốn nhận được hàng hóa từ người chuyên chở thì họ phải xuất trình những giấy tờ chứng minh mình là người nhận hàng có tên trên B/L cho người chuyên chở.

Việc sử dụng biện pháp nào nhằm tăng hiệu quả, hạn chế rủi ro trong quá trình giao nhận hàng hóa đòi hỏi người xuất khẩu và người nhập khẩu cần có sự đánh giá chính xác thực tế tình huống đang diễn ra, đồng thời cần có sự tư vấn và phối kết hợp đồng bộ, chặt chẽ của các bên liên quan như hãng tàu, ngân hàng trong quá trình thực hiện giao dịch. ■

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2. *International Chamber Commerce (ICC) Official Opinion R758/TA675rev-2009-2011*
3. *ICC – UCP 600*
4. *Bộ luật Hàng hải Việt Nam 2005.*



thức TTDA với các phương thức tài trợ truyền thống, cũng như từ việc phân biệt sự khác nhau cơ bản giữa mô hình PPP theo hình thức BOT, BTO, BT và mô hình PPP đang được thí điểm theo Quyết định 71 cho thấy, phương thức TTDA tại các TCTD và mô hình PPP theo Quyết định 71 của Thủ tướng Chính phủ có một đặc điểm giống nhau là bắt buộc nhà đầu tư phải thành lập DNDA để thực hiện các DAĐT của nhà đầu tư. DNDA này đóng vai trò là người vay chứ không phải các nhà đầu tư góp vốn vào DAĐT đóng vai trò là người vay trong phương thức TTDA.

Do đó, nếu việc Chính phủ Việt Nam khuyến khích, ưu đãi và hỗ trợ các DAĐT theo mô hình PPP hay theo hình thức BOT, BTO và BT trong thời gian tới thông qua các công cụ và chính sách tài chính, hỗ trợ dịch vụ công, hỗ trợ một phần chi phí chuẩn bị đầu tư và một phần chi phí đầu tư xây dựng, chi phí bồi thường, hỗ trợ và tái định cư... với mục đích làm tăng tính khả thi của các DAĐT sẽ tạo điều kiện thuận lợi rất nhiều cho việc các TCTD ở Việt Nam mạnh dạn tham gia vào các khoản TTDA cho các dự án có nhu cầu vay vốn từ các TCTD trên cơ sở chia sẻ lợi ích và rủi ro từ các DAĐT được tài trợ. Mặt khác, một khi các TCTD ở Việt Nam đã nhận thấy được hết những cơ hội mang lại tiềm năng lợi nhuận hấp dẫn cũng như là những rủi ro mà họ có thể gánh chịu khi tham gia tài trợ cho các DAĐT theo mô

hình PPP, họ sẽ có sự chuẩn bị về mặt định hướng chiến lược kinh doanh, chính sách nhân sự, chính sách huy động vốn, chính sách quản lý rủi ro để làm tăng tính khả thi về nguồn vốn đầu tư cho các DAĐT, qua đó cũng sẽ góp phần thúc đẩy việc thực hiện các DAĐT theo mô hình PPP có sử dụng nguồn vốn vay từ các TCTD ngày một nhiều hơn. ■

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5. *Credit Analysis, Fundamentals of Project finance*, A DC Gardner workbook.

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goods against a B/L the carrier reasonably believes to be genuine, and the like.”¹

¹ (i) Giao hàng không cần yêu cầu xuất trình bản gốc surrender B/L; và/hoặc

(ii) Trong trường hợp vận đơn không chuyển nhượng chỉ ra rằng người chuyên chở có thể giao hàng cho người nhận hàng có tên trên vận đơn với các chứng nhận hợp lý mà không

Cách hiểu về Surrender B/L vẫn chưa được thống nhất ở những năm sau đó. Tuy nhiên, trong Official Opinion R758/TA675rev-2009-2011, ICC đã cho rằng với những B/L xuất hiện chứa đựng điều khoản tương tự trên, theo Điều 20(a) (v), chúng được xem là điều khoản chuyên chở, và do đó, các ngân hàng sẽ không xem xét nó khi kiểm tra B/L. Vì thế, hiện nay Surrender B/L không được áp dụng trong phương thức thanh toán tín dụng chứng từ mà ở các phương thức thanh toán khác.

* Cách sử dụng

Nhìn vào Sơ đồ 5 cho thấy, người gửi hàng sau khi giao hàng cho người chuyên chở và nhận bộ B/L gốc, thay vì chuyển bộ B/L đó cho người nhận hàng thì chủ hàng chuyển bộ B/L gốc tại bất kỳ văn phòng nào của hãng tàu ngoài cảng đến (thường là cảng xếp hàng) và thanh toán mọi chi phí liên quan. Văn phòng của hãng tàu tại nơi nhận B/L gốc sẽ gửi văn bản xác nhận (bằng FAX hoặc email) việc xuất trình này cùng với chi tiết lô hàng cho văn phòng của hãng tàu tại cảng đến. Xác nhận này phải thể hiện rõ bộ vận đơn có số, ngày, tháng đã được “xuất trình” (surrendered) rồi và yêu cầu công ty, đại lý của họ giao

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cần phải xuất trình bản gốc surrender B/L; và/hoặc

(iii) Cho phép giao hàng đổi lại xuất trình B/L nếu người chuyên chở tin tưởng một cách hợp lý tính chân thực của vận đơn, và những trường hợp tương tự.