

## SKETCH FOR A PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S "BEING AND NOTHINGNESS"

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**Abstract:** *Phenomenology seeks to trace back to the origins of things in themselves, prior to human consciousness in experience. Edmund Husserl is regarded as the father of phenomenology, aiming to establish it as a rigorous philosophy. According to Husserl, phenomenology is not merely a philosophical movement; it is fundamentally a philosophical method, a particular attitude of thinking. As a method, phenomenology has become the foundation upon which existentialism relies, enabling it to reveal the existential structure inherent in humans. This article outlines the fundamental ideas of J-P. Sartre in his work "Being and Nothingness," focusing on properties of consciousness such as intentionality, pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, as well as characteristics like emptiness, negation, projection, and freedom. Through his engagement with phenomenology, Jean-Paul Sartre uncovered the deepest dimensions of consciousness that had previously gone unnoticed.*

**Keywords:** *Jean-Paul Sartre, phenomenology, consciousness, intentionality, pre-reflective, reflexive, negation, being, non-being, projection, possibility, and freedom*

### 1. Introduction

"To be is to fly out into the world, to spring from the nothingness of the world and of consciousness in order suddenly to burst out as consciousness-in-the-world"<sup>1</sup>. The excerpt above was penned by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) in a brief article published in 1939 under the title *Une idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl: L'intentionnalité* (Intentionality:

A fundamental idea in Husserl's phenomenology) which was his first statement about consciousness and the relationship between consciousness and the world. This conception highlights the significance of consciousness in the world and illustrates the evolution of J-P. Sartre's thought from the influence

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of earlier idealist philosophical theories to existential phenomenology. The initial ideas regarding consciousness in *L'intentionnalité* (1939) stem from J-P. Sartre's phenomenological research conducted in Berlin (Germany) during 1933-34. He subsequently constructed a vast framework of existential phenomenology for himself, which was articulated in his most important philosophical work, establishing Sartre's reputation: *Being and Nothingness: A Treatise on Phenomenological Ontology*<sup>2</sup>. The phenomenological surveys of consciousness in this work served as a crucial foundation for Sartre to develop concepts of existentialism, including human freedom, facticity, bad-faith, authenticity, relationships with others, commitment, etc.

If we do not grasp J-P. Sartre's phenomenology of consciousness, we will struggle to understand the foundation of his existential phenomenology. Entering his existential problems without examining the phenomenology of consciousness will allow us to see only the tip but not its source. J-P. Sartre's existentialism is a philosophy of human reality; it must first emerge from the theoretical standpoint of consciousness or subjectivity, as consciousness or subjectivity serves as the gateway and starting point for the monumental work of *Being and Nothingness* in particular, as well as Sartre's entire philosophical system: ““existentialism” is a doctrine that makes human life possible and

also affirms that every truth and every action imply an environment and a human subjectivity”<sup>3</sup>. Descartes was the first to identify the subject-cogito, “I think, therefore I am / I am thinking therefore I exist”<sup>4</sup> (*Cogito ergo sum*), while Sartre delved deeper into subject-consciousness, uncovering many layers where Cartesian cogito represents only one level. A significant factor that led Sartre to this crucial discovery was German phenomenology.

## 2. Phenomenology from Edmund Husserl to Jean-Paul Sartre

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is regarded as the father of phenomenology, though he was not the first to employ the term “phenomenology”. In *Introduction to Phenomenology*, (Heidegger, 2005)<sup>5</sup> contends that the term is a combination of the Greek words “φαινόμενον” (phainomenon) and “λόγος” (logos). It first emerged in the 18th century, in the work *Neues Organon* (Lambert, 1764)<sup>6</sup> by the German philosopher Johann H.Lambert (1728-1777). In this work, he “employed the term “phenomenology” in the title of the fourth section... to signify a *science of appearance (Schein)* which allows us to proceed from appearances to truth, just as optics studies perspective in order to deduce true features of the object seen”<sup>7</sup>. Here, the term *phenomenology* first appeared. Subsequently, the term was found in Kant, and later in Hegel, who assigned this concept a specific role in his work *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit).

In Hegel's view, he "considered phenomenology as the science of the experience of consciousness, hence the name phenomenology of spirit"<sup>8</sup>.

By Husserl's time, phenomenology had become a rigorous science focused on describing the structures of experience as they manifest in human consciousness. The guiding principle of Husserl's phenomenology was "Back to the things themselves" The central question is whether we perceive things as they truly are and how we can attain that. In both philosophical and ordinary perception, according to Husserl, our judgments or perceptions of things are clouded by philosophical theories and prior scientific knowledge, along with cultural practices and subjective biases, which dominate our minds, distort reality, and hinder our ability to perceive things as they are. Even when we encounter objects through our senses, it remains uncertain, as Descartes noted, whether the object genuinely exists or not. This is why Husserl established a phenomenological science aimed at revealing the essence of things, back to things in pure appearance confronting consciousness, unclouded by philosophical and scientific theories, biases, culture, or habits, etc.

To execute the return, phenomenology employs the techniques of *epoché* (suspension, bracketing, setting aside) and undergoes three stages of reduction. Note that all of these techniques are operations of human thinking. But what is being bracketed and what is being

set aside? Tran Duc Thao, in 1951, in a study on phenomenology, asserted: "setting aside the general perspective of existence, no longer believing in this world while still living in the world..."<sup>9</sup>. Husserl stated more clearly: "We do not change anything about our belief, that belief, in itself, as what it is... But the thesis undergoes a change: while belief in itself remains what it is, we put it back, so to speak, "out of the game", "outside the perimeter", "in parentheses". It is still there, as it was in the parentheses in which we confined it"<sup>10</sup>. The task of phenomenology is simply to describe the phenomena that occur in our minds as images projected on a screen. We do not aim to determine whether the phenomena we see actually exist outside. The question of existence is "set aside," left "in bracket." Even if those phenomena are "illusions," we can still describe them, exactly as they appear in our minds"<sup>11</sup>. By suspending and bracketing all prior knowledge and experiences of the world, we are left with pure consciousness—consciousness that is not clouded by past knowledge and judgments, allowing us to perceive pure phenomena. Next, Husserl employs three reduction techniques, which involve accepting the limitations of our cognition to what is directly presented, thereby restricting cognition solely to phenomena. Husserl presents three reduction techniques: 1. Philosophical reduction forces us to reduce all previous theories; 2. Eidetic reduction, that is, placing the existing

world in brackets so that consciousness only focuses on phenomena; 3. Phenomenological reduction, which is the core content of phenomenology, thanks to which consciousness removes from consciousness what is not pure consciousness (only pure consciousness remains). The phenomenological method is not to analyze phenomena but to describe phenomena, which is the method of eidetic intuition<sup>12</sup>.

Thévenaz (1962) argued that *phenomenology* at its original sense (Husserl) was a philosophy of essence, or an “essentialism” rather than an existentialism<sup>13</sup>, because it puts all existence in brackets, it isolated ideal essences. Sartre agrees with Husserl that the phenomenological method brings us back to the things themselves, and by that method Sartre brings abstract man back to real, concrete, flesh-and-blood man in the world, but disagrees that Husserl brackets existence, because, according to Sartre, consciousness must be placed in the world and man must exist-in-the-world, because the two have a close, inseparable relationship, because one is the basis for the existence of the other. Being-in-the-world is a term introduced by Heidegger in his work *Sein und Zeit* (Being and Time) which Sartre inherited and applied in his work Being and Nothingness. Both Heidegger and Sartre used Husserl’s phenomenology in their own way. Through the phenomenological method, through the gateway of Dasein, Heidegger extracted the abstract Being in

capital letters, but Sartre did the opposite, Sartre did not extract the being in lower case but clarified existence.

Thus, the phenomenological method that Sartre employs in Being and Nothingness is not a method of bracketing and reducing existence from consciousness but a pure description of all the experiences of consciousness in the world, aimed at clarifying the existence of human beings within that world. Sartre critiqued Husserl’s phenomenology that “he has shut himself up inside the *cogito* and deserves—in spite of his denial—to be called a phenomenalist rather than a phenomenologist. His phenomenism at every moment borders on Kantian idealism”<sup>14</sup>. And Heidegger was also criticized by Sartre, that: “Heidegger is so persuaded that the “I think” of Husserl is a trap for larks, fascinating and ensnaring, that he has completely avoided any appeal to consciousness in his description of Dasein”<sup>15</sup>. That is why Heidegger “begins with the existential analytic without going through the *cogito*. But since the Dasein has from the start been deprived of the dimension of consciousness, it can never regain this dimension”<sup>16</sup>. In the light of Sartre’s existential phenomenology, consciousness manifests its essence, consciousness is consciousness of something, consciousness-in-the-world, in the midst of this life, and it struggles for its freedom. According to Sartre, it is condemned to freedom.

### 3. The fundamental concepts of the phenomenology of consciousness in Jean-Paul Sartre's "Being and Nothingness"

Catalano<sup>17</sup> argues that the phenomenological method reveals the objective structure of being rather than the merely the structure of the mind, because consciousness is, by its very nature, consciousness *of* an object. Consciousness is not, as for Descartes, the self-awareness of an independent and self-sufficient mind examining its own ideas to prove which of them truly represent reality. Rather, consciousness automatically refers to or "tends to" its object; it is *intentional*... Intentionality, for Husserl, gives us a new way of looking at the Cartesian cogito (that is, the certitude and nature of our consciousness). Thus, "intentionality were a starting point for the entire ontological investigation of consciousness and being"<sup>18</sup>.

#### 3.1. Intentionality of Consciousness

One of the most important elements of phenomenology is the intentionality of consciousness, because it is the basis for all conscious cognition. Intentionality means that "all consciousness is consciousness of something". Husserl writes: "It belongs to the essence of cognitive experiences to have an *intentio*: they refer to something; they relate themselves in one way or another to an objectivity. This "relating itself to an objectivity" belongs to them even if the objectivity does not. What

is objective can appear, can achieve a certain givenness within appearance, even though it neither really exists in the phenomenon of knowing nor as a *cogitatio*"<sup>19</sup>. Intentionality is the essence of consciousness. "All consciousness is always consciousness of something. Obviously there is no consciousness without intention, consciousness without intention is empty consciousness"<sup>20</sup>.

The conception of intentionality of consciousness was not introduced by Husserl, but by Franz Brentano (1838-1917) who had first proposed this notion. However, in Brentano, "the notion of intentionality did not yet have more than a psychological bearing; it was the characteristic mark of all psychic phenomena. In Husserl it has from the beginning an epistemological bearing, then transcendental, even ontological: it characterizes a new relationship between the subject and the object, between thought and being, an essential relationship whereby these are inseparable and without which neither consciousness nor the world could be grasped"<sup>21</sup>.

In the Introduction to *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre stated: "All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness *of* something. This means that there is no consciousness which *is* not a *positing* of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no "content." We must renounce those neutral "givens" which, according to the system of reference chosen, find their place either "in the world" or "in the

psyche”<sup>22</sup>.

Thus, the doctrine of intentionality holds a significant role in Sartre’s phenomenological ontology, “it allows him to separate being into two regions, the for-itself and the in-itself. At the same time, it is the foundation for his doctrine of freedom, in which he finds the only possibility for truly human action”<sup>23</sup>.

Intentionality is Sartre’s sole means of escaping idealism and transcendental realism. He argues that the object cannot dissolve into consciousness nor can it enter consciousness, as it is not of the same nature as consciousness: “You see this tree, to be sure. But you see it just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst of the dust, alone and writhing in the heat, eight miles from the Mediterranean coast. It could not enter into your consciousness, for it is not of the same nature as consciousness”<sup>24</sup>. Therefore, the world of objects, according to Sartre, is not perceived within consciousness but in the real world where they exist. Sartre believes that: “the first procedure of a philosophy ought to be to expel things from consciousness and to re-establish its true connection with the world, to know that consciousness is a positional consciousness of the world. All consciousness is positional in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object, and it exhausts itself in this same positing”<sup>25</sup>.

The object perceived is not within consciousness; only the transcendental object exists in consciousness. “All

consciousness is consciousness of something. This definition of consciousness can be taken in two very distinct senses: either we understand by this that consciousness is constitutive of the being of its object, or it means that consciousness in its inmost nature is a relation to a transcendent being. But the first interpretation of the formula destroys itself: to be conscious of something is to be confronted with a concrete and full presence which *is* not consciousness”<sup>26</sup>. Therefore, for Sartre, every consciousness presents to itself a transcendental object (a transcendental object). The real object exists out there, in the real world. Sartre provides an example to clarify this.: “A table is not *in* consciousness—not even in the capacity of a representation. A table is *in* space, beside the window, etc. The existence of the table in fact is a center of opacity for consciousness; it would require an infinite process to inventory the total contents of a thing. To introduce this opacity into consciousness would be to refer to infinity the inventory which it can make of itself, to make consciousness a thing, and to deny the cogito. The first procedure of a philosophy ought to be to expel things from consciousness and to re-establish its true connection with the world, to know that consciousness is a positional consciousness of the world”<sup>27</sup>.

Our understanding of the object is never complete, nor does the object provide us with a perception of the entirety of its manifest existence. Yet, despite this seemingly realistic

appearance, for both Sartre and Husserl, the object (the table) in particular and the world in general are not independent of consciousness. Although the table cannot enter the mind (consciousness) as a content of awareness, it is not primarily an independent reality, determined as it is in itself and then coming into contact with consciousness to be perceived. Consciousness and the world are given to each other simultaneously.

Above, we have examined the aspects of the intention of consciousness and the object of consciousness. Thus, the question arises: how does consciousness project the world of objects? To address this question, Sartre outlines projective consciousness through two processes or levels of consciousness: Pre-reflective and Reflective.

### ***3.2. Two processes of consciousness: Pre-reflective and Reflective***

From the very beginning, Sartre and Husserl both asserted that consciousness is intentionality; it is directed towards an object outside itself, and the object posited in consciousness is a transcendental object. For this process to occur, that is, for consciousness to be directed towards the object, it must exist at the first level that Sartre refers to as pre-reflective consciousness. At the pre-reflective level, consciousness directly perceives the object without intermediaries. For instance, when I am reading a novel, the objects that appear in my consciousness are the characters in the story, without my noticing the

physical material that constitutes the novel. I am immersed in the allure of the plot, captivated by the complexity of the characters, without paying attention to the context around me, and for a moment, I temporarily “forget” who I am. At this moment, my consciousness exemplifies what Sartre calls pre-reflective consciousness, completely occupied by the object. However, man is a peculiar being because he possesses not only pre-reflective consciousness but also the ability to reflect on himself. Although I am absorbed in the charm of the narrative and its characters, I do not merge into the story and lose myself; I am not the story. I recognize this and maintain a separation, reading the narrative from a certain distance, questioning its meanings as an observer. I understand that I am reading a story without merging into it, which represents a second level of consciousness that Sartre terms reflective consciousness.

Every pre-reflective consciousness of an object simultaneously reflects the conscious subject; in other words, “every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself”<sup>28</sup>. In that sense, the consciousness that positions an object is pre-reflective consciousness; on the other hand, reflective consciousness is non-positional consciousness, which Sartre more clearly refers to as self-consciousness.

“When I count the cigarettes in the pack, I have the impression of disclosing

an objective property of this collection of cigarettes: they are a dozen. This property appears to my consciousness as a property existing in the world. It is very possible that I have no positional consciousness of counting them. Then I do not know myself as counting<sup>29</sup>. It is evident that consciousness is always consciousness of something; it is not simultaneous, either regarding the object or myself. When I am aware of an object in the external world, I am not simultaneously aware of myself; this reflects the limited capacity of consciousness, which cannot be both external and internal. However, for a brief moment, consciousness can reflect; it turns inward and recognizes that it is counting cigarettes, as in Sartre's case: "If anyone questioned me,... "What are you doing there?" I should reply at once, "I am counting"<sup>30</sup>. So what is the basis for the possibility of reflective consciousness, Sartre writes: "reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected-on. It is not reflection which reveals the consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito. At the same time it is the non-thetic consciousness of counting which is the very condition of my act of adding.... Thus in order to count, it is necessary to be conscious of counting"<sup>31</sup>. The knowing subject, according to Sartre, is the condition for every cognitive activity: "the necessary

and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object" and, first of all, "is that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge"<sup>32</sup>.

The purpose of identifying these two processes of consciousness is to demonstrate that humans, in addition to the consciousness directed towards the external world—known as pre-reflective consciousness—also possess a consciousness directed towards the internal world, or the reflective consciousness. This level of consciousness allows individuals to not be entirely merged with the object, enabling them to separate themselves as observers to evaluate, form opinions, and assign meaning to the object. If human consciousness remains at the pre-reflective level, then "All that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, toward the table; all my judgments or practical activities, all my present inclinations transcend themselves; they aim at the table and are absorbed in it"<sup>33</sup>. But clearly, I take it a step further; I reflect on myself and the external world. I recognize the stone, yet I do not identify with it because I understand that I am not the stone. Such an unreflective conscious act is meaningless and absurd, as it never truly occurs; I remain a conscious subject capable of reflection. Furthermore, an unconscious act, according to Freud, does not constitute consciousness. Sartre, on the other hand,

denies the existence of the unconscious. He acknowledges only a completely unconscious world, the realm of the object in-itself. Attempting to locate a fragment of the unconscious within consciousness is an effort to integrate the in-itself into the core structure of the for-itself, which is ultimately a futile endeavor. The for-itself is an empty, insubstantial consciousness, capable of negation, and this consciousness serves as the foundation of freedom.

### 3.3. *Characteristics of Consciousness*

“Consciousness” in Sartre’s conception is not nothingness in the sense of nothingness, nor is it nothingness in the context of Nihilism; rather, it is non-being. Sartre’s famous work *L’Être et le Néant* is translated by many scholars as *Being and Nothingness*. In my view, this translation fails to accurately convey Sartre’s concept of human consciousness. The French word *Néant* translates to absence. However, the absence of something does not imply that it does not exist or equate to nothingness. Pierre’s absence does not indicate that Pierre does not exist; it merely signifies that he is not present in this café. And the term *Néant* in the title of Sartre’s work signifies a type of conscious being (being-for-itself), which is “Consciousness,” a Non-Being that stands in opposition to Being, rather than Nothingness. Clearly, Sartre is a philosopher who, from the outset, refrained from delving into metaphysics, choosing not to address the question of why there is something rather than

nothing, as earlier metaphysicians had done. Sartre’s ontology is not metaphysics; however, within this ontology, he explores the two facets of existence: being-in-itself and being-for-itself in the light of phenomenological description. For-itself in Sartre is still a being but a being without a definite shape, situated at the core of being, which is why it is called to as non-being: “Non-being can only be destroyed on the ground of being: if non-being can be made to appear, it does not appear before or after, it is not outside of being, but it is right in the depth of being, in its heart, like a worm”<sup>34</sup>. In the novel *Nausea* (*La Nausée*), Sartre wrote: “It is unimaginable: to imagine non-being, you must already be there, in the middle of the world with your eyes wide open and active; non-being is just an idea in my head, an idea that exists floating in this immensity: this nothingness does not precede existence, it is a being like other existences and appears after many other existences”<sup>35</sup>. Consciousness is undoubtedly a being, yet it lacks a definite shape, which is why it is referred to as non-being. However, it differs from *en-soi* (being-in-itself) and is not nothingness, as it still exists (being-there). According to Heidegger, it is *Dasein*, while J-P. Sartre describes it as *pour-soi* (being-for-itself).

“Consciousness” in Sartre’s conception lacks a definite form due to its characteristics: Consciousness is primarily intentionality; every

consciousness is conscious of something. What consciousness directs itself towards is an object external to it, yet the table cannot enter our minds; it exists in consciousness as a transcendental object. As we have observed, for Sartre, consciousness is consciousness of something other than itself, and in this sense, it embodies transcendence. “The transcendent object appears to or for consciousness, and therefore it can thus be described as a phenomenon”<sup>36</sup>. Second, consciousness is empty; it has no content. It is likened to a spotlight that shines directly on an object, illuminating it without intermediaries, just as consciousness illuminates the world. When consciousness encounters an object, it loses its inherent purity and clarity, becoming opaque because the object serves as its content. Fortunately, consciousness possesses the power to negate the object. Thanks to this ability, it is not constrained by anything, for it is nothing; it can empty its contents. Through this power of negation, it can transform the situation and reshape reality within itself, granting it the reality it desires: “Pain-consciousness is an internal negation of the world; but at the same time it exists its pain—i.e., itself—as a wrenching away from self... But pain-consciousness is a project toward a further consciousness which would be empty of all pain; that is, to a consciousness whose contexture, whose being-there would be not painful”<sup>37</sup>. Third, consciousness lacks essence, as

it is nothing, unlike the predetermined existence of a stone or a tree. Sartre believed that Descartes was correct when he stated, “I think, therefore I am,” but this theory faltered when Descartes assigned an essence to thinking. Fourth, consciousness is a projection; it looks to the future, aspiring to be something different from both the past and the present. It is what it is not in the future and is not what it was in the past. In other words, it is not a being-in-itself but a being-for-itself: ““In-itself nihilated in for-itself.” In other words the for-itself... is as being which is what it is not, and which is not what it is” (Sartre, 1957, p.566). Sartre’s statement above is likely a play on words, both affirming and negating, which renders its content ambiguous. Regardless of whether it is read forwards or backwards, or if Sartre employs an affirmative writing style only to negate it, both convey the same idea that: “Consciousness is a non-entity, and it is not an object” “For-itself is not being, for it makes itself be explicitly for-itself as not being being. It is consciousness of — as the internal negation of —. The structure at the basis of intentionality and of selfness is the negation, which is the internal relation of the For-itself to the thing.” Consciousness exists in the dimension of time and “flies” ceaselessly between past-present-future in a continuous self-projection, in an endless flight: “The For-itself is present to being in the form of flight; the Present is a perpetual

flight in the face of being. Thus we have precisely defined the fundamental meaning of the Present: the Present is not<sup>38</sup>. The flight of consciousness concludes when consciousness ceases to be consciousness, when it dissolves into the grass and trees. Only death can define its essence. Thus, consciousness is what it will be in the future, and the future remains an unfinished project. Sartre refrains from attributing anything certain and authentic to consciousness, as it is a vague entity, lacking a definite shape; it is formless, prior to essence, and represents a possibility (*possibilité*) that remains open to the future.

#### 4. Conclusion

The phenomenological method that Sartre employs is fundamentally Husserl's; however, unlike Husserl, Sartre does not close parentheses, suspend, or set aside the living world as Husserl did, because man is a Being-in-the-world, as Heidegger describes it. If anything, Sartre only closes parentheses on the past, puts aside the Ego, and suspends the existence of a God to pave the way for human existence, since man exists independently of God's presence. According to Sartre, whether God exists or not is irrelevant to the living world of man. He asserts that the past is the past, thus it becomes a being-in-itself, and the Ego is merely a social construct; it does not reside within the structure of consciousness. Through phenomenological description, Sartre unveils a profound emptiness,

lack, and freedom of consciousness, for Consciousness is Non-Being.

Thévenaz stated in his work *What is Phenomenology*: "For the first time in the history of phenomenology, in Sartre's time, it became a philosophy of action, of freedom, of the construction of the human self, of a kind of pragmatism in the broad sense. To live is to act"<sup>39</sup>. Perhaps this is a correct assessment of J-P.Sartre's existential phenomenology. With his phenomenological description, Sartre exposed the multi-layered internal structure of consciousness. Basically, consciousness is intention, it is directed towards a transcendental object. Sartre's great discovery is the concept of transphenomenality: "The phenomenon of being requires the transphenomenality of being"<sup>40</sup>. With this discovery, Sartre addressed the dualistic problem that earlier philosophy had established, namely the division between soul and body, and the separation of thought from external objects. For Sartre, the object in consciousness is a transphenomenon, or a transcendental phenomenon. It is through the capacity to transform the object of the external world into a transcendental object that human consciousness can recognize the object while simultaneously understanding itself, allowing it to reflect upon or question the object, its existence, and its own identity within the world. A second significant and crucial discovery of Sartre is the recognition of the freedom of consciousness; because consciousness is formless, it possesses the ability to negate

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circumstances, the past, and objects, reality. Consciousness exists in the world, thus it is free. The essence of freedom within the human realm, enabling it to lies in the emptiness of consciousness. be consciousness. Consciousness and Moreover, consciousness is nothing the world cannot be separated; they are other than human consciousness, human neither one nor two, as each requires the

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- 22 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, *Ibid.*, p.li.
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- 24 Sartre, J.-P. 1970. Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology, *Ibid.*, p.4.
- 25 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, *Ibid.*, p.li.
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other to reveal itself.

- 27 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. Ibid., p.li.
- 28 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. Ibid., p.liii.
- 29 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. Ibid., p.liii.
- 30 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. Ibid., p.liii.
- 31 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. Ibid., p.liii.
- 32 Sartre, J.-P. 957. Ibid., p.lii.
- 33 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. Ibid., p.li-iii.
- 34 “Le néant ne peut se néantiser que sur fond d’être : si du néant peut être donné, ce n’est ni avant ni après l’être, ni, d’une manière générale, en dehors de l’être, mais c’est au sein même de l’être, en son cœur, comme un ver”. Sartre, J.-P. 1943. Ibid., p.56.
- 35 “pour imaginer le neant, il iallait qu’on se trouve deja la, en plcin monde et les yeux grands ouverts et vivant; le neant ga n’etait qu’une idee dans ma tete, une idee existante flottant dans cette immensite: ce neant n’etait pas venu avant l’existante, e’etair line exigence comme une autre et apparue apres beaucoup d’autres”. Sartre, J.-P. 1938. p.190.
- 36 Copleston, F. C. 1994. “The Existentialism of Sartre”, In *Modern Philosophy: From the French Revolution to Sartre, Camus, and Lévi-Strauss: Vol. IX* (pp. 340–367). Image Books, Doubleday, p.348.
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- 38 Sartre, J.-P. 1957. *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. Ibid., p.333.
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