

Aleksandr Gelievich Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and its geopolitical implications

Ho Si Quy

Prof., Dr., Institute of Social Sciences Information, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences
Email: hosiquy.thongtin@gmail.com

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Abstract: *Professor Aleksandr Gelievich Dugin (Александр Гельевич Дугин) of Moscow State University Lomonosov is a political activist whose ideology has exerted considerable influence in Russia for about 30 years. While inheriting Russian anti-Western ideas dating back to the 19th century, his “Neo-Eurasianism” is further enhanced by the nostalgia for Russia’s past under the great tsars and part of the powerful Soviet Federation. Dugin’s basic thesis is that rather than economic factors, geographical ones are the core cause of Russian power now and then. He called on the Russians to carry out a mission to revive the past, oppose the West and NATO, exercise control over the surrounding peoples, and permanently dominate the center of Eurasia. While mostly promoted as a significant spiritual factor in Russia since 2008, Neo-Eurasianism is considered the one causing negative consequences for Russia, Europe and the world, especially since the breakout of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.*

Keywords: Aleksandr Gelievich Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism, Russian and The West, Russia-Ukraine Conflict

1. Introduction

The Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out as a shock to many, including major global leaders and politicians. However, the conflict is not a surprise to several think tanks, politicians and experts studying Russia - Western strategic studies. Taking a close look on Russia’s political life, some extreme geopolitical doctrines have long become quite popular in Russia and had considerable influence on President Vladimir Putin. The Neo-Eurasianism doctrine (Неоевразийство) of Aleksandr G. Dugin is an example of such ideology. As of early August 2022, it has been almost

half a year since Russia embarked on the “special military operation” in Ukraine. It is hard to say that Russia is winning as Ukraine is still not giving in and has become more determined to defend its national independence and autonomy. The Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Peskov has announced, more than once, Russia’s ambition to liberate the whole of Ukraine (Linda, 2022). The losses for all sides in the war are momentous. The world’s geopolitical order has been overturned. The risk for a nuclear war has also been elevated.

2. About Aleksandr G. Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and its political consequences

2.1. Background

After the end of the Cold War, nationalism has been on the rise in almost every nation-state. Extremist nationalism broke out alongside authentic patriotism. However, the influence of extremist ideologies has never grown as strongly as in Russia. Despite not officially pronounced in Russia's foreign policy, President V. Putin has mentioned several times about building a Greater Eurasia, or a Greater Eurasian Partnership (Большая Евразия/ Евразийского Партнёрства;), for instance, at the Russia - ASEAN Summit (Sochi, 2016) or at the Belt and Road Forum (Beijing, 2017) (Путин, 2017). President V. Putin considers the Greater Eurasia Strategy as Russia's renaissance effort. Sergey Karaganov, advisor to several Russian presidents since the end of the Cold War, is deemed the author of that idea. Accordingly, the Greater Eurasian Partnership is an open project for all continental countries from east of the Atlantic Ocean to west of the Pacific Ocean to cooperate based on the connections among the European - Asian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and ASEAN. Russia's eastward Eurasian Policy meets China's westward ambitions in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since 2017, both countries have unhesitatingly discussed long-term ambitions, including promoting the opportunities and profits from BRI to all countries in Asia and Europe (Капранов, 2017).

Nevertheless, until before the Russia-Ukraine conflict took place in 2022, no country among the ASEAN and European blocs has established any stance regarding the initiative.

2.2. Classical Erasianism and the "Heartland Theory" of Halford J. Mackinder

Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism is a peculiar mix between a political-social trend and a cult, between nationalist elements of the crowd and nostalgic mindsets of academics, and between H.J. Mackinder's¹ Heartland Theory and classical Eurasianism, which was first developed by Russian intellectuals living in exile after 1917.

Mackinder's theory views the large continent connecting Asia with Europe as the center of the Earth. The center of that central continent is the heartland, where the Eastern Europe region and Russia is the heart of the Eurasian continent. Emphasizing the geopolitical status of the heartland, Mackinder believes that whoever controls the center of the globe, or the "heartland", will control the rest of the globe. Mackinder states: "Whoever dominates the major continent of the world will dominate the whole world itself"². Unfortunately, his extremist views were later adopted by Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) and in a way instigated Germany's quest to dominate the world during that time. Many ideas in Mackinder's theory were disproved by several political scientists and historians, but some European academics and politicians

¹ Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947) was a famous British geopolitician, Former Director of the School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, Member of Parliament, the United Kingdom. He was instrumental in developing geography into a scientific discipline. In his work "The Geographical Pivot of History" (1904) and especially in "Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics Reconstruction" (1919), Mackinder had introduced the "Heartland Theory".

² See *Halford Mackinder: British political geographer*, retrieved on 31 July 2022 from <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Halford-Mackinder>.

until now are still keen on using his ideologies to explain complex relationships between power and geopolitics.

Although Russian people follow a wide spectrum of political - ideological stances, this theory still gains traction as it invokes the nationalist mentality of a vast country taking the heartland position at the center of the earth.

After the October Revolution happened in October 1917, the number of people migrating out of Russia was relatively high, among them a handful of well-known intellectuals. These intellectuals harbor great emotions towards Russia but were rejected, to the point that they had to live in exile in the West. Here, they developed a Slavic mindset - a mentality also known as "Westophilia" (Западофилия - hatred, dislike, or even bigotry towards the West; in Western Europe there was also an anti-Slavic mentality called "Slavophilia"). That was the historical context when Mackinder inadvertently gave birth to classical Eurasianism.

Classic Eurasianism, came into being among the community of exiled Russians, was originally a form of Russian philosophy which entails the status and characteristics of Russian society. Later on, it became a socio-political movement and even morphed into a political party active in Eastern and Western Europe until the dawn of World War II. The first exemplary theorists of this ideology are the geographer and economist P.N. Savitsky (П.Н. Савицкий, 1895-1968), the linguist and ethnologist N.S. Trubetskoy (Н.С. Трубецкой, 1890-1938), philosopher G.V. Florovsky (Г.В. Флоровский, 1883-1979) and the arts scholar P.P. Suvchinsky (П.П. Сувчинский, 1892-1985). They were seen as a group of talented individuals

who shared the Westophilia mentality. In the 1920s, when Soviet Union gained more power, the emigrants' partiality also grew. Classical Eurasianism became more and more attractive as it united diverging interests and thus exerted strong influences. The whole of Europe was debating about Eurasian ideas. Emotional sentiments were also a crucial factor when the theory captivated not only Russians living abroad but also Russians living at home. Every follower of Eurasianism kept asking themselves questions that they considered to be paramount: Who were they - Easterners or Westerners? Or were they a different type? And so what route should Russia follow? These questions are still pre-eminent among many Russians even until today (Isaeva, 2020).

Classic Eurasianism was an independent ideology (not connected to any traditional theories) and had a complex mental - cultural nexus. Followers of the theory believed in a third continent between Europe and Asia. That continent had Eurasia - a separate civilization from the Greek - Roman Western civilization. Eurasia had a distinct culture that was neither European or Asian. The Eurasian civilization was built upon Russia's half fascination, half hatred towards the West during the 19th Century. This ideology originally denounced Russian people who adored Western culture, but then shifted to denounce Western ideology (the majority of the Russian aristocrats under the Tsars was fascinated about the West, to the point that their names also adopted French or German pronunciations. Many Russian cultural architecture projects mimicked Western European styles, and at the time a lot of people from Western Europe also worked and lived in Russia).

Followers of classical Eurasianism believed that individualism was irresponsible, while freedom and democracy were not suitable for Russians. They valued the traditional Russian society, which was deemed to represent Russian authenticity. In that society, the Orthodox Church was more important than the State (because governments changed constantly but Orthodoxism would stay unchanged). Russian Mysticism (Русская Мистика) was superior to Western Rationalism (because only Russian Mysticism could explain the deepest areas of the Russian soul). Russia must have a distinguished development trajectory and did not need to follow the West. Western standards were considered alien and conflict with Russia's Eurasian features.

Since 1991, Eurasianism has been revived in Russia's schools and institutions. Today, almost every Russian knows by heart a poem written in 1866 by F.I. Tyutchev, a Russian ideologist: "Who would grasp Russia with the mind? For her no yardstick was created: Her soul is of a special kind, By faith alone appreciated"¹. It was no coincidence that recently during a military parade at the Red Square on 9 May 2022, after the Ukraine operation had commenced for almost three months, that President V. Putin reinstated: "We are a different country. Russia has a distinct path. We will never abandon our love for the nation, our beliefs, our traditional values, and ancestral customs. In the West, all of these thousand-year values have been overthrown" (Путин, 2022).

¹ See the poem: "Умом Россию не понять", Стихотворение Федора Тютчева, <https://rupoem.ru/tyutchev/umom-rossiyu-ne.aspx>, accessed on 31 July 2022.

Reflecting on this mentality, Dina Khapaeva, a Russian American scholar comments: "The idea of the West is central to Russian identity. Without the rejection of the West, Russian identity does not exist. This makes them very different from other European cultures. The fascination with the West is at the core of Russian identity. It's not just a love-hate relationship: Russia cannot imagine itself without comparing itself to the West and without rejecting the West. It's a very peculiar culture in that respect" (Khapaeva, 2022).

2.3. Aleksandr Gelievich Dugin's Eurasianism

Classical Eurasianism and A.G. Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism are built upon Russian anti-Western ideas in the 19th century. However, Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism emboldens Russian people's nostalgia of not only the great past under the Tsars, but also about the irrecoverable losses of over a century of predominance of the Soviet Union, which has been dissolved and now stifled by the West and NATO.

Born on 07 January 1962 in Moscow, A.G. Dugin has a PhD in Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science from Moscow State University (MGU). He is the founder of Neo-Eurasianism (Ноевразийство), an ideological movement with considerable influence in Russia. Mackinder's geopolitical ideas about the "Heartland" have been mysticized and espoused by Dugin in several of his publications about the post-Soviet Union space.

During 1990-1992, Dugin explored the decoded archives of the Committee for State Security (KGB). From the materials that he found, the program "Secret of the Century" was developed and broadcasted on Channel 1 of Russian television, attracting a large audience. During 1993-1998, he

was a strategist and leader of the National Bolshevik Party (NBP - Национал-большевистская Партия). During 1998-2000, he was advisor to the Chairman to the State Duma G. Seleznev and head of the Center for Geopolitical Expertise of the Advisory Council at the State Duma. From 2001, Dugin was Chair of the Political Committee of the Pan-Russian Social-Political Movement EURASIA. From November 2003, Dugin became leadership of the International Eurasian Movement (MED)¹ (Horvath, 2008). In March 2008, he became the strategist of the United Russia Party - the largest party in Russia and the political mouthpiece of President V. Putin. In September 2008, Dugin was awarded professorship at the Lomonosov Moscow State University. According to survey results of more than 40,000 votes on the Openspace website, Dugin ranks 36th among the the most influential intellectuals in Russia (<http://people.su/38155>). In 2014, Dugin was discharged from his position as head of the Sociology Department at Lomonosov Moscow State University (after he called to “kill, kill, kill” those who conducted barbarous acts in Ukraine) (Reference: Пектор, 2014).

During the 2000s, Dugin frequently advocated for Eurasianism in the news. He actively supported the two leaders V. Putin and D. Medvedev, further calling for a foreign policy that prioritized national interests. His Neo-Eurasianism ideology and activities in the Eurasian Youth Union were deemed by many international scholars and politicians as either fascism or fascist-leaning (Shenfield, 2000).

Among Dugin's works on Neo-Eurasianism, the most notable ones according to our evaluation are: 1) *The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Great Space* (Основы геополитики: Большое пространство), first published in 1997 and has been translated into French, Romanian, Serbian, Georgian, Italian, Spanish, English, etc; 2) *The Eurasian Foundation* (Основы Евразийства), published in 2002; 3) *The Fourth Political Theory: Russia and Political Thought in the 21st century* (Четвертая политическая теория. Россия и политические идеи XXI века), published in 2009; 4) *Eurasian Mission: Program Materials of the International Eurasian Movement* (Евразийская миссия: программные материалы Международного Евразийского Движения), published in 2014.

In general, almost every idea that Dugin introduces is controversial because of its atypicality. He does not hesitate to declare his will to build a great Russian nation, at the same time he is also merciless towards neighboring communities that do not bow to Russia. Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism urges Russians to revive the past, oppose the West and NATO, take over the periphery ethnicities and assume perpetual dominance of the heartland - the center of the Eurasian continent.

In *The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Great Space*, Dugin wrote: “The foundational law of geopolitics is the Great Space principle, defined by Mackinder and Haushofer and developed by Carl Schmitt. According to this principle, a country's sovereignty depends not only on military power, technology development, or economic basis, but also depends on *the space and geographical location of the lands and territories of that country.*

¹ See Halford Mackinder: British political geographer, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Halford-Mackinder>, *Britannica*, accessed on 31 July 2022.

Classical geopolitical thinkers have written hundreds of books demonstrating that sovereignty directly depends on geopolitical independence and self-sufficiency in the region¹. Peoples and nations that are fighting for their sovereignty must figure out self-sufficiency within their territory. During our time, there are only very large countries situated in areas that are strategically protected by other state groups from probable attacks (military, political or economic attack) that possess self-sufficient capacity” (Дугин, 1997: 239).

We have tried to search for Dugin’s similar ideas in other sources and initially did not think that Dugin saw Russia as too vast and did not need external supplies. Analysis on self-sufficiency in the Russian space is tied to Dugin’s explanations about Russia’s great geopolitical status in the heart of Eurasia: “The geopolitical move of external efforts against unipolarism needs to take into account the vital geographic and strategic role of the Russian land and the Russian people. In other words, efforts against followers of unipolarism who now control the Russian political space to a certain degree, should not become an overall phobia towards Russia. Furthermore, key geopolitical interests on the cultural, religious, economic and strategic aspects of Russians align with the ambitions to create a Great Space against Atlantic unipolarism. Because of this, national tendencies of political sects within Russia need to unite with all projects against unipolarism that are led

by pro-integration movement outside of Russia” (Дугин, 1997: 240).

According to Dugin, Russia’s key geopolitical interests, whether it is cultural, religious, economic or political aspect, all align with the construction of a Great Russian Space to fend off Western civilization - culture, the latter termed by Dugin as “Atlantic unipolarism”. From Dugin’s perspective, Asia, Eastern Europe and several other regions in the world are all against the West, but Russia is the one taking lead in this mission: “Nevertheless, with its character as the Heartland, the core of the Eurasian Island, in the current dire geopolitical context, Russia still fares better than other regions in the quest against Atlantism’s geopolitics; Russia has become the center of a Great Space with more options”². In reality, Russia’s self-destruction of politics³ has forced the country to leave its central role in the geopolitical game for a while (we hope it’s only a short while). Therefore, we need to think of other possibilities to create an alternative Great Space, so that other countries and nations which reject militarism⁴ can make independent decisions without waiting for Russia’s geopolitical awakening (Moreover, these decisions can actually evoke that awakening)” (Дугин, 1997: 240).

When Dugin wrote “Moreover, these decisions can actually evoke that awakening” in 1997, he still thought that Russia and Russian politicians were still

¹ MED - A movement advocating for the establishment of an Eurasian empire by uniting Russia with the former Soviet Union states and Russian-speaking regions outside of the Russian Federation, particularly Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea.

² Original: самодостаточности, автаркийности региона.

³ Original: лучше всех остальных регионов могла бы противостоять атлантистской геополитике и быть центром альтернативного Большого Пространства

⁴ refers to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (HSQ).

not “interested” with Neo-Eurasianism. Thus, Dugin forecasted and proposed that for Russia and the Russian people, the geopolitical status can be implemented according to four main pathways and an additional last-resort pathway. Among those pathways, the second proposed by Dugin, unfortunately, had occurred: “The second pathway of the war is determined by the formula: the Russian Federation against one (or several) neutral states with shared borders. Such a love can easily arise due to the extreme instability of the newly formed states on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This country, in principle, will not have any rights to ownership, since their strategic power does not allow them to defend their independence without external help. The collapse of their political, social and economic systems is inevitable, and of course it cannot affect their regime for the Russian (or pro-Russian) population and for the Russian government itself” (Дугин, 1997: 252).

It is worth noting that, when Dugin wrote “Russian population (or pro-Russian)”, he meant to refer to Russians and Russian-speaking people in Russia. This idea is clearly “chauvinist” and arrogant. Therefore, in 1997, when Dugin’s *The Foundations of Geopolitics* was published, the book created a philosophical storm within Russia and in the spiritual life of Russian society, opening the path for Dugin to become the new intellectual for the ideological system of the Russian right. Many deny Dugin’s influence on President V. Putin. However, it is no coincidence that *The Foundations of Geopolitics* was chosen by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces to be the “classic” (mandatory) document for senior officers in the Russian army to study (Starr, 2014).

Regarding Ukraine, Dugin said: “Ukraine as an independent country with territorial ambitions would pose a great threat to the entire Eurasian continent. It would make no sense to talk about continental geopolitics without solving the Ukraine issue. This does not mean that Ukraine’s economic or cultural linguistic autonomy needs to be restricted, or that Ukraine needs to become an administrative region of the Russian centralized state (as in previous periods under the Tsarist empire or under the Soviet Union). But strategically, Ukraine needs to become a projection of Moscow to the South and the West” (Дугин, 1997: 199).

Dugin’s ideas about Russia’s domination of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people are blatantly clear - Ukraine must be Russia to both the South and the West. But it does not stop short at that. All the peoples living in this region, according to Dugin, should be under Russia’s absolute control and their right to national self-government must be subject to Russia’s decision. “The absolute geopolitical imperative of Russia on the Black Sea coast is unlimited control of the entire region, from Russia to Ukraine and the Abkhazia territory. The whole region can be divided arbitrarily according to their cultural aspects. National rights and autonomy can be granted to Russians in the Crimea, the Tatars, the Cossacks, the Abkhazians, and the Georgians, but Moscow must still exert absolute control over political and military situations. These regions must fully reject external influences such as from the West and from Turkey (or even from Greece). The northern coast of the Black Sea should exclusively belong to Eurasia and subject to Moscow’s rule” (Дугин, 1997: 199).

Dugin sometimes considers his political doctrine to be representative of the

“Third Way”, which is high and above “Traditionalism” and “Conservative Revolution”. But since 2009, Dugin has called his doctrine the “Fourth Way”, after and above “Communism”, “Fascism” and “Liberalism”. In *The Fourth Political Theory: Russia and Political Thought of the 21st Century*, published in 2009, he argued that “Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism, Ideologies of the Twentieth Century, have outlived their usefulness. Therefore, it is necessary to create a new political doctrine, The Fourth Way.” He added: “To fill the void, Russia needed a new political ideology. Liberalism is inappropriate, and Communism and Fascism are unacceptable. So, we need the Fourth Political Theory. And if for someone it is just a matter of free choice, the exercise of political will, which can lead to both affirmation and denial, for Russia it is a matter of life and death - Hamlet’s question¹. If Russia chooses that, this automatically means that a fourth political doctrine will be created - it will “exist”. On the other hand, Russia does not choose, then the Fourth Political Doctrine will “not exist” and quietly leave the historical arena, dissolving into a global world not created and controlled by us”² (Дугин, 2009: 8).

When Dugin wrote: “If Russia does not choose, the Fourth Political Doctrine will ‘not exist’ and quietly leave the historical arena, dissolving into a global world not created and controlled by us”, he meant to incite the great nationalist sentiment of the Russian people and Russian leaders. It is not difficult to understand that the majority of the Russian population (according to

Russian data) support the Russian military attack on Ukraine. Perhaps, nationalist sentiment would naturally make many Russians bitter to hear that the globalized world order today is a world not created and controlled by Russia.

In all of Dugin’s writings and publications, the core of his theory is that it is geopolitics, not economics, that is at the core of Russia’s strength, past and present. Because economically, there were periods when Russia was strong and periods when Russia was weak; but in terms of geopolitics, Russia cannot be powerful without dominating the heartland. Thus, according to Dugin, Russia’s direct opponent for the past two centuries ago has been the United States in the Atlantic space, the power that still dominates Europe and the West. American and Western values are incompatible and have always been at odds with the ethnic and cultural diversity of Eurasia. Russia, therefore, if it wants to be strong and developed, must continue the tradition of the Eurasian Empire - a geopolitical power based on geographical factors that was created many centuries ago by the Tsars and later the Soviet Union in the twentieth century (Дугин, wiki.ru).

Many researchers believe that Dugin has a very paranoid view of politics and a distorted view in economics. For example, in *The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Great Space*, Dugin writes: “The economic crisis is a great setting for civil strife, which in certain circumstances can spur great deluges, although the primary lines of power may be other non-economic resources. Today, the appeal to nationalism, ethnicity, patriotism, freedom has the ability to regulate the purely material side of life and make it secondary. But even in the case where the material side prevails,

¹ refers to countries that do not participate in NATO (HSQ).

² Original: раствориться в глобальном, созданном и управляемом не нами мире.

due to the discrediting of Marxism and socialist dogmas, the material side cannot represent itself in the form of a consistent and credible political ideology system. Most likely, the economic factor in conflicts will occur simultaneously, rather than as a defined category”¹ (Дугин, 1997: 199).

In recent years, through Dugin’s activity in the United Russia Party, the “International Eurasian Movement” (MED), the “Eurasian Youth Union” and his lectures on Great Russian nationalism in many places, especially in breakaway regions such as Abkhazia and Donbass, Neo-Eurasianism has incidentally been referred to as the “fourth political doctrine”, replacing the three major ideologies of the twentieth century and conveying the central ideology of the Eurasian continent not only to fanatical Russians, but also to many other Russians. A lot of new literature supporting Neo-Eurasianism and dissertations about Dugin have been written and published in recent years. Since 2014, after Dugin was dismissed from his position as Dean of the Department of Sociology, the literature on Dugin and Neo-Eurasianism has increased even more.

Most recently, after nearly a month of fierce fighting in Ukraine, on the website “The Fourth Political Theory” of the International Eurasian Movement, Dugin had responded to Francis Fukuyama when Fukuyama wrote about Russia’s getting bogged down in Ukraine in the *Washington Post* on March 14, 2022². In this article, Dugin was not only unhesitant but also very proud of Russia’s desire to completely

abolish the Western liberal order: “This thesis is³, in itself, absolutely correct. The special military operation in Ukraine was the decisive impetus for establishing Russia as a civilization, as the sovereign pole of a multipolar world⁴. Yes, this is precisely the war with the liberal order”⁵ (Dugin, 2022). Also in this article, on Russia-Ukraine relations in the Eurasian strategy, Dugin reiterated: “The importance of Ukraine for the revival of Russia as a completely independent power of the world has been well established by previous generations of Anglo-Saxon geopolitical scientists, from Mackinder to Brzezinski. Since the early stages, it had been stated as follows: without Ukraine - Russia is not an empire, with Ukraine - it is an empire” (Dugin, 2022).

No longer a fantasy in the minds of certain politicians, Dugin’s Doctrine had become a significant spiritual factor in Putin’s military campaigns in Georgia in 2008, in Crimea in 2014, and now particularly obvious in Ukraine. Dugin is considered the author of the initiative to annex Crimea to Russia as early as 2008 when Russia waged a war with Georgia. He was also the one who believed that war between Russia and Ukraine was “inevitable” and called on President V. Putin to launch a military offensive into eastern Ukraine, which he always called “Novorossia” (the New Russia Region; this name was also later used by President V. Putin). Dugin himself went to South Ossetia to provoke the secessionist movement there. In particular, his harsh remarks on the Donbass region

¹ the inevitable cause (HSQ).

² See: Fukuyama F. (2022), “Could Putin lose? Here’s why the ‘End of History’ author is optimistic”, *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/14/putin-could-lose-ukraine-fukuyamaoptimistic/>, accessed on 31 July 2022.

³ the war with the liberal order (HSQ).

⁴ Original: The special military operation in Ukraine is the decisive momentum of establishing Russia as a civilisation, as a sovereign pole of a multipolar world.

⁵ Original: Without Ukraine - Russia is not an empire, with Ukraine - it is an empire.

of Ukraine have attracted the attention of the entire Russian people and the world. Currently, after more than 100 days of the fierce Russia - Ukraine conflict, Dugin is the most vocal person in mass media to advocate to Russians, Russian politicians and Russian President V. Putin that a Great Russia would not be possible without Ukraine and its ethnic Russian-speaking regions.

The public's opposition to the special military operation, as the West thinks, is actually not what worries Putin. It is rather Dugin's radicalism in recent days which has fueled war advocates that worries Putin. "Public fervor could escalate, making Putin more hawkish and aggressive, even if this sentiment stems from Kremlin propaganda. This is a very important point: Putin has awakened a dark nationalism on which he himself is increasingly dependent" (Stanovaya, 2022).

Dugin's thought is welcomed by many Russians but is considered by the Western public to have caused negative consequences for Russia, Europe and the world, especially since the Russia - Ukraine conflict broke out. It is not clear how the conflict will end, and although Russian politicians do not admit it, it is hard to deny that the world geopolitical order after the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 has been changed partly due to Dugin's hysteria and his Neo-Eurasian Doctrine. In 2014, the American magazine Foreign Policy included Dugin in the list of 100 "Global Thinkers" of the modern world in the category of "agitators" (Агитаторы).

The geopolitical consequences of Neo-Eurasianism have become a real factor in the war, causing Ukraine to shatter, Ukrainian civilians and soldiers on both sides to suffer enormous casualties, the world economy to

decline, and the global political landscape to completely transform.

3. Conclusion

Russia in the hearts of the majority of Vietnamese people is a great country with a civilization and culture that is unique in the world. Moreover, with a history of more than half a century standing shoulder to shoulder to help Vietnam build and protect the country, Russia and the Russians have been really loyal and compassionate friends and allies. But it is not possible to agree with Russia's forceful attack on Ukraine, an independent sovereign state, in accordance with all international legal and political conditions approved by the United Nations and recognized under international law.

Therefore, at the 11th Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Russia - Ukraine conflict on March 1, 2022, Vietnam firmly expressed its view: "The history of our own nation is a history of war sufferings. It has repeatedly shown that wars and conflicts to this date often stem from outdated doctrines that promote power politics, the ambition to dominate, impose and use force to settle international disputes. Some conflicts are still associated with historical factors, misunderstandings and misconceptions" (Dang Hoang Giang, 2022). This statement is not accidental or incidental. Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism, which some Russians are promoting, cannot be excluded from the list of "outdated doctrines that promote power politics, have ambitions to dominate, impose and use force to settle international disputes".

The Ukrainian people, throughout their history, during the Second World War and from the very beginning of the Russia - Ukraine conflict, have proved to be a

peace-loving people who bravely fight for independence, rights and freedoms of their country. The Ukrainian army is still very weak compared to the Russian army. Ukraine is still being destroyed and may inevitably be wiped out, at least the eastern part, Donbass, Kherson, etc. Ukrainians are continuing to suffer loss, death, and pain every day. There is no reason for humanity to turn its back on Ukraine. Supporting Ukraine's freedom, sovereignty, peace and independence is the voice of conscience, reason and international justice. The Vietnamese people with all our historical experience and loyalty to Ukraine cannot stay out of this.

Dugin, in the opinion of many scholars, is a radical, or even zealous, thinker. His thoughts on the Eurasian continent before February 24, 2022 are still thought by many to be purely delusions existing in the minds of some individuals, with nothing to worry about. However, when President V. Putin ordered a "Special Military Operation" in Ukraine, the problem has become much more serious. More people, including intellectuals, scholars, especially some politicians and neo-Nazi factions, are influenced by Dugin's thought. President V. Putin has never claimed that he is influenced by Dugin, but many scholars have pointed out his changes in Russian foreign policy and in his own thought from the early 2010s until today owe much to this influence.

Today, there is a perception that Russia must regain the position of the Great Russian Empire located in the heart of the Eurasian continent, including the peoples that are neither Asian nor European. It is believed that Russia's sacred mission is to expand the Russia's borders, rule over all Russian-speaking peoples, form a rejuvenated Russian Empire, as well as to oppose and

abolish Western civilization and culture. This perception cannot be considered wise or correct, whether historically or logically. This concept goes against the objective trend of social progress.

The Russia - Ukraine conflict is just over 180 days and there is not enough evidence to confirm this concept will fail or win. But if Russia wins, this time the victory will be completely different to the victory in 1945 □

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