

THE SOLUTION COMMUNICATION SECURITY IN CHIP ESP8266

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ABSTRACT

As a revolutionary and profound technology, the Internet of Things (IoT) has the potential to fundamentally transform our society by simply connecting sensors and smart devices to the Internet. It is no doubt that the security of communications between smart devices is an important issue in IoT. In this paper, we deal with the security scheme for communications between ESP8266 modules, which can provide embedded Wi-Fi capabilities at a low cost. Based on an existed security scheme for ESP8266, we proposed an enhanced mutual authentication mechanism and ECDH-key agreement on curve 25519. Compared with the existed schemes, security analysis and performance evaluation show that the new scheme can resist various communication attacks, saying modification attacks, replay attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks.

Keywords: *IoT, ECDH, curve 25519, ESP8266, mutual authentication*

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VỀ MỘT GIẢI PHÁP BẢO MẬT TRUYỀN THÔNG TRONG CHIP ESP8266

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TÓM TẮT

Internet of Things (IoT) là một công nghệ mang tính cách mạng sâu sắc, nó có khả năng biến đổi căn bản xã hội bằng cách kết nối các cảm biến với thiết bị thông minh thông qua Internet. Cho nên, bảo mật thông tin liên lạc giữa các thiết bị thông minh là một vấn đề quan trọng trong IoT. Bài báo này, chúng tôi đề cập đến sơ đồ bảo mật để liên lạc giữa các mô-đun với chip ESP8266, với kết nối Wi-Fi với chi phí thấp. Đề xuất đưa ra được cải tiến dựa trên sơ đồ bảo mật đã tồn tại cho ESP8266, chúng tôi đã đề xuất một cơ chế xác thực nâng cao và thỏa thuận khóa ECDH dựa trên đường cong 25519. So sánh với các đề xuất trước đó, phân tích tính bảo mật và đánh giá hiệu suất cho thấy sơ đồ mới có thể chống lại các cuộc tấn công khác nhau như tấn công sửa đổi, tấn công lại và tấn công trung gian.

Từ khóa: *IoT, ECDH, curve 25519, ESP8266, mutual authentication*

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1. Introduction

The Internet of Things technology is leading a better life by using the physical devices, and other appliances embedded with software, sensors and connectivity which enable these things to connect and exchange data. Many different protocols provided the devices connectivity, such as Message Queuing Telemetry Transport, are designed for remote location connections with limited network bandwidth. The preventive security mechanisms are used to secure IoT communication, such as device identity management, encryption, and access control as well as device auditing and monitoring. This technology can be applied in different fields, ranging from industry, infrastructure, and agriculture to many other smart applications. Due to the ubiquitous connectivity, the security of communication between IoT devices plays a more and more important role in IoT.

The ESP8266 module is a system on a chip (SoC) by means of the device itself contained microcontroller capability and full TCP/IP stack which allowed for single-chip devices capable of connecting to Wi-Fi. ESP8266 is used to provide the IoT systems with embedded Wi-Fi capabilities at the lowest cost with the greatest functionality [1]. Since the devices are interrelated and uncovered to many vulnerable attacks, such as eavesdropping, tampering, and jamming attack [2], hence more security measures are needed. Recently many techniques, such as the symmetric key encryption [3], and the asymmetric cryptography [4], [5], [6], have been used to enhance the security of IoT.

The purpose of this paper is to propose an improve security model using Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) suitable for ESP8266 based on Kodali and Naikoti's model [7]. In their model, the NIST P-192 curve is used for ECDH key exchange which is suitable to the low-cost device environment. However, the curve P-192 is disapproved for key establishment, according to NIST-SP 800-56A recommendation for

pair-wise key-establishment schemes using discrete logarithm cryptography [8]. While selecting the safe curves for elliptic-curve cryptography [9], [10], the following criteria should be considered: efficiency, security and lightweight.

In the public-key cryptography, the strength of the cryptography method depends on the difficulty of solving the mathematical problems. The security of elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) depends on the ability to compute a point multiplication and the inability to compute the multiplicand given the original and product points. The difficulty of the problem is determined by the size of the elliptic curve [11].

To achieve the authentication and authorization, using ECC seems to be the best choice, due to the limited storage capacity of ESP8266. The complementary which makes this module popular are inexpensive, more compatible development environments, flexible design, and enhanced function. According to the pros, ESP8266 families are popular for many IoT applications, such as flooding detection system, data center temperature monitoring, home automation system. Recently, ESP8266 is also introduced in industry 4.0 based on service quality and transmission reliability [13]. The module of ESP8266, ranking from ESP8266-01 to 14, which improves over the previous one with reference to the hardware of the module. The various features include the number of GPIO pins, the types of pins, antenna on the chip and presence of shield, types of the modules packaging and storage capacity. The ESP8266 module requires sufficient power supply with 3.3V – 3.6V and ≥ 250 mA [13]. It is power efficient and low in cost.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work. In Section III, review the preliminaries of related knowledge. The design of our scheme and its implementation are presented in Section IV. The security analysis and performance evaluation are shown in Section V. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VI

2. Related knowledge

To guarantee the broadcast over an insecure network, the authentication and key agreement protocol have been widely used in IoT. Arasteh et al. [14] introduced a new lightweight authentication protocol for WSNs using session key agreement and new sensor node registration in 2016, which has become the foundation of the follow-up work. Later, Fan and Niu [15] pointed out that the scheme in [14] has some security weaknesses, for example, it cannot prevent the malicious attack. Hence they proposed a new scheme with the fundamental agreement which is secure and robust against the malicious attack. In another study, Jiang et al. [16] proposed an improved scheme over the security weaknesses of Amin et al.'s authentication scheme for WSNs [17] which is vulnerable to offline guessing attack and tracking attack. However, the computation cost of the new scheme [16] is comparatively high as a result of using the Rabin cryptosystem.

To solve the eavesdropping problem in communications between the constrained devices, many scholars have done a lot of work. In 2016, Goyal and Sahula [18] presented a suitable lightweight security algorithm for low power IoT devices. In [13], different public-key cryptosystems, including ECDH, RSA, and ECC for IoT gadgets, are compared, and analysis shows that ECDH has better performance than other algorithms. ECC has been standardized by many international organizations [8], [19], [20], [21]. In 2015, Seo et al. [4] proposed a lightweight authentication method of Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake using ECDH for local Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) environment. This scheme can improve the overhead occurring at SIP call set-up time. In 2017, Hammi et al. [3] designed a security protocol for WSNs based on symmetric encryption algorithm (Advanced Encryption Standard Galois/Counter Mode).

Reference [5] proposed an anonymous ID-based user authentication with key agreement

on ECC for smart cards. However, the mutual authentication cannot be achieved in their protocol. Later, Zhang et al. [22] proposed a new version of anonymous authentication with key agreement protocol used for client-server environment to address the flaws of the protocol in [5]. The protocol in [22] is efficient and can provide more features than the protocol in reference [5]. Teguig et al. [23] introduced a new mechanism for public keys management using an elliptic curves cryptosystem which provides 161 bits security. In 2018, Li et al. [6] proposed a symmetric cryptography and hash based user authentication protocol with privacy protection for WSN in industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environment. In this paper elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is introduced to the design of authentication for IoT, since it is more efficient, and with much shorter key length than RSA while achieving the same security level.

Recently, Kodali and Naikoti [7] introduced a security model based on public-key exchange by using ECDH on NIST P-192 curve for IoT using low-cost devices. Their model provides several security and functional features with high efficiency. However, this scheme is unable to resist replay attack, since the curve NIST P-192 is unsecured, which means that attackers can intercept the data and re-transmit it to users successfully. In this paper, the author would like to demonstrate how to mount replay attacks based on the previous scheme. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:

- a) To overcome the flaws of the security model in [7], present a curve25519 based mutual authentication between smart devices with ECDH.
- b) The design of a new security model with two-way authentication by trusted authority verifying the risky node during exchange key between two devices.
- c) The comparisons of security properties and performance with related authentication and key exchange protocols show that, our scheme is more suitable to resist usual attacks with acceptable computational efficiency.

3. Design of scheme

In this section is a review Kodali and Naikoti's security model and an introduction a new security model with two-way authentication mechanism by trusted authority verifying the risky node during exchange key between two devices And Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange is used for securing communications between ESP8266 modules.

3.1 Review Kodali and Naikoti's security model




Figure 1. Kodali and Naikoti's scheme

Their security model is based on Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) on NIST P-192 curve [7]. The element of each parameter is shown in figure 1.

The following is an explanation of public key exchange procedures shown in Figure 1.

- At first, two parties choose the public function curve $p-192$ over a prime field F_p , and public string G .
- Alice selects an integer a randomly, then performs point multiplication with G and calculates the public key $T_a = \text{curve } P-192(a, G)$ and sends T_a to Bob.
- Bob also selects an integer b randomly, then performs point multiplication with G and calculates the public key $T_b = \text{curve } P-192(b, G)$, and sends T_b to Alice.
- Alice calculates:
 - $aT_b = \text{curve } P-192(a, \text{curve } P-192(b, G))$
- Bob calculates:
 - $bT_a = \text{curve } P-192(b, \text{curve } P-192(a, G))$

3.2 Our scheme

In our security model, the trusted authority (TA) as a third-party is introduced to support monitoring during exchange key between two devices. Every device of our IoT network

should be registered in the TA firstly, and then TA will generate an authentication key with the identity of the device and a random token. This allows the devices to verify each other's during exchange keys that correspond to the certified devices. As shown in Figure 2, the IoT network architecture of our model consists of three layers: the perception layer, the network layer and the application layer. The trusted authority is in application layer. The devices are located in perception layer, and can communicate with others through network layer.




Figure 2. IoT network architecture

The new model is based on ECDH key agreement protocol and two-way authentication scheme, which consists of two sections: the registration phase, and the mutual authentication and key agreement phase. Table I outlines the notations used in the remainder of this paper, and the detailed description of the proposed scheme are given in the following subsections.


Table 1. Notations used in this paper

Symbol	Description
a, b	random digital number
G	generator point
Y_a, Y_b	public key parameter
ID_i	the unique identifier ID of device i
S_i	the key of device i for authentication
S_i'	the authentication key of device i for key exchange
$h()$	the one-way hash function
$token_i$	the unique random number of each key authentication
T_i	the time stamp of device i
S_{Ti}	Trusted Authority session authentication key for device i

3.3 Registration phase

In the registration phase, we proposed a key management based on "personal identity".

Once S_i is created and set into the device, the device is able to be associated with the ESP8266 network.



The personal identity is aimed to ensure the communications between a device A and TA cannot be interrupted by any other devices in the same ESP8266 network. Thus each device has a secret identity in our IoT system. In addition, this personal identity function has more advantage. Even if an attacker could get an authentication key EF of one device, it will not influence the security of the rest of devices belonging to the same system network. Because of each device has unique identifier which provide by TA.

In this section is an adoptable the authentication approach presented in [4], [3], [15], [24] to ensure security under the communication attacks. Let S_i denotes the authentication key agreement which will install in concerned devices and Trusted Authority (TA). The ECDH based key exchange on curve25519 for devices.

```

graph TD
    A["Device A  
(IDA, SA, a, G)"] -- "Compute the keys  
SA* = h(SA)  
EA = aG" -- "(IDA || SA* || EA)" --> B["Device B  
(IDB, SB, A, G)"]
    B -- "Separate the components  
IDA  
Ans = (SA* || EA)" -- "(IDA || SA)" --> FA["FA  
(IDA, SA)"]
    FA -- "SA* = h(hashSA @ IDA)  
Check SA* != SA  
If yes, add TA  
SA* = h(SA)  
Generate SA' = h(SA* || TA)" -- "(SA' || TA)" --> B
    B -- "Check SA*  
h(SA* || TA) > SA  
If yes, generate EA = h(G)" -- "(IDB || EA)" --> A
  
```

Step 1: The device A computes the authentication key S_A from S_A by using hash function, where S_A derives from TA. The public key Y_a is obtained by ECDH, where $Y_a = aG$. Then A sends the generated keys S_A , Y_a , ID_A to B as the authentication response.

Step 2: B gets an association request $(ID_A || S_A || Y_a)$ from A, then separates it for next process. The device B requests the key S_{TA} from TA, by sending the $(ID_A || S_B)$ to check whether A belongs to the system.

Step 3: TA returns the request to B if the device is not blacklisted, that is to say, TA will check $S_B^* \neq S_B$ whether ID_B is registered in the system or not. If it is registered, TA will extend the process of authentication key management. Then TA will create the key S_{TA} (see equation 3) by hashing the combine value of keys S_A and time stamp T_A , where S_A is hash of S_A (see equation 2). S_{TA} will be used for the association request of the exchange key encryption in the unicast mode. Finally, the trusted authority will transfer $(S_{TA}||T_A)$ to device B.

$$S_{TA} = h(S_A \oplus T_A) \quad (3)$$

Step 4: After receiving the $(S_{TA}||T_A)$ from TA, B will compare the S_{TA} with $h(S_A \oplus T_A)$ (see equation 4). If S_{TA} is equal $h(S_A \oplus T_A)$, it means that A is an authenticated device registered in the system. Then B will accept the public key Y_a from A and send his public key $Y_b||ID_B$ to A. Otherwise, the association request will be stopped.

$$h(S_A \oplus T_A) = S_{TA} \quad (4)$$

In the end of the key exchange operation, the device A performs point multiplication between private key of A and public key of B, and computes $aY_b = abG$. Meanwhile, the device B computes $bY_a = baG$ then both of them have the same encrypt and decrypt key which enable them to communicate securely.

Remark 1: Enhance security of our scheme.

To ensure our scheme cover the full security, the enhance 6-way handshake via the upper scheme is not respond the sufficient authentication on both side. By means of device A and B are not sure one another is risky or not, so this problem will be covered in this next process. The full security based on sufficient authentication is describe in (Figure 5). We can summarize this process as following:

The first three steps are as the same as upper scheme show in (Figure 4).

In Step 4: B receives the authentication key $(S_{TA}||T_A)$ from TA which needs to checkup A by checking the key S_A from A. Then, B compares the S_{TA} with $h(S_A \oplus T_A)$ (see equation 4). Later, device B need to calculate his own authentication key S_B , where S_B is computed from S_B by using hash function. After checking A, the device B sends an association request to device A. The request contains the unique ID of B, the authentication key S_B , and the public key Y_b , where $Y_b = bG$ obtained by ECDH.

Step 5: A gets the association request $(ID_B||S_B||Y_b)$ from B, then separates it for next process. Device A requests the key S_{TB} from TA by sending the $(ID_B||S_A)$ to TA to check whether B belongs to the system or not.

Step 6: TA will return the request to A if the device is not blacklisted, that is to say, TA will check whether ID_A is registered in system or not. If it is registered, TA will create the key S_{TB} (see equation 6) by computing the key S_B , and T_A , where S_B is used to create the key S_B (see equation 5). S_{TB} will be used for the association request of the exchange key encryption in the unicast mode.

$$S_B = h(S_B) \quad (5)$$

$$S_{TB} = h(S_B \oplus T_A) \quad (6)$$

Trusted authority will transfer $(S_{TB}||T_A)$ to device A.

Finally, A receives $(S_{TB}||T_A)$ which is used to verify B by checking S_B . Then A compares S_{TB} with $h(S_B \oplus T_A)$. If they match, A will accept Y_b and ID_B . Otherwise, if the retrieved S_B or T_A or both of them are wrong, which means that the keys have been modified during their transmission, then $h(S_B \oplus T_A)$ and S_{TB} will not match. In this case, the key S_B will not be accepted, which means that B could not be authenticated, and the association request will be stopped. A denies the pubic key Y_b and ID_B .

In the end of the keys exchange operation we confidence that device A and device B are not risky for system on the point of both device A and device B are honest and be able to communicate to each other securely with the same key $bY_a = aY_b = abG$.




Figure 5. The enhanced key exchange protocol

4. Security analysis and performance evaluation

4.1 Security analysis

In this section, the proposed algorithm will be inspected for practical negative use cases such as replay attack. It is observed that in such case the model is able to detect the attacker.

Proposition 1 Registration phase

Proof 1: This proposition is proved through showing that it is impossible for attacker to construct the unique value of S_i . Firstly, it shows that the unique value of $token_i$ cannot

be constructed by an adversary. Based on the explanation of S_i in figure 4, it can be seen that only the TA can set the value of $token_i$. Then, we show that the unique value $token_i$ has to be a component in the expression of S_i . The expressions of S_i can be computed as follows.

$$S_i = h(token_i \oplus ID_i)$$

Thus, an adversary cannot calculate the value of S_i which means that he cannot know the value of $token_i$. Hence, the attacker cannot get S_i through ID_i by mean of a replay attack.

Proposition 2 Mutual authentication and Key agreement phase are analyzed the whole attack process to prove that our scheme is safe and robust, and it can resist the Man-in-The-Middle attack.

Proof 2:

Case 1. The attacker poses as device A.

Step 1: The attacker can get ID_A and generate new values $(S_X || Y_X)$ for key exchange and send $(ID_A || S_X || Y_X)$ to device B.

Step 2: Device B need to check it by sending the request $(ID_A || S_B)$ to TA.

Step 3: TA sends the response $(S_{TA} || T_A)$ to the request device.

Step 4: Final verification could be done by device B comparing the two keys. If they do not match, it means that the key S_X is wrong, S_{TA} is not pairing and the TA is not authenticated, then the association operation will be stopped.

$$h(S_X \oplus T_A) \neq S_{TA}$$

$$h(S_X \oplus T_A) \neq h(S_A \oplus T_A)$$

Case 2. The attacker poses as device B.

Step 1: Device A sends $(ID_A || S_A || Y_a)$ to the attacker.

Step 2: the attack needs to check it by sending the request $(ID_A || S_A)$ to TA.

Step 3: TA sends the response $(S_{TA} || T_A)$ to request device.

Step 4: The attacker can compares the two keys. If they match, it means that S_A is correct, thus S_{TA} is pairing and the TA is authenticated.

At the same time attacker can get ID_B and generate new values $(S_Y || Y_y)$ for key exchange and send $(ID_B || S_Y || Y_y)$ to device A

Step 5: device A needs to check it by sending the request $(ID_B || S_A)$ to TA.

Step 6: TA sends the response $(S_{TB} || T_B)$ to request device.

Final verification could be done by device A comparing the two keys. If they do not match, which means that S_Y is wrong, S_{TB} is not pairing and the TA is not authenticated, then the association operation will be stopped.

$$h(S_Y \oplus T_A) \neq S_{TB}$$

$$h(S_Y \oplus T_A) \neq h(S_B \oplus T_A)$$

At the end of key exchange process, it shows that device B (attacker) does not belong to system. Thus, device A needs to update the keys to make sure the attacker cannot use $(ID_A || S_A)$ for next broadcast, since the attacker obtains $(ID_A || S_A)$ from A. The key can be updated through re-registration to get new unique value of S_A , new $token_A$.

4.2 Performance evaluation

To evaluate the computational cost of our scheme in servers and clients, we define some notations as follows.

T_{PM} : The computing time of elliptic curve scalar point multiplication;

T_H : The computing time of secure hash function.

- : No operations need to be performed.

Comparison of security features and functionality

Table 2. Comparison of security features and functionality

	Schemes				
	Kodali ^[7]	Li et al. ^[6]	Qi ^[25]	Park ^[24]	Our
Mutual authentication	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Key agreement	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Inside attack resistance	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Modification Attack	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Replay attack resistance	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Suitable for ESP8266	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Table 3. Computation cost comparison

Registration			Authentication	
	User	Server	User	Server
Park ^[26]	-	$3T_H$	$3T_{PM} + 5T_H$	$3T_{PM} + 5T_H$
Our	-	$2T_H$	$2T_{PM} + 4T_H$	$4T_H$

This research aims to propose a light weight and robust security. Hence, in this section is to compare our scheme with some recently related scheme in terms of computation cost. Detailed of comparisons are show in Table III. We summarize the result of mutual authentication with key agreement phase in similar proposed protocol. The consumption is mainly determined by above unit, T_H and T_{PM} . In general, T_{PM} is the most costly execution among these computations. The proposed model could reduce the consumption of server, and consumes less computing time on both the devices side and server side. Moreover, we also compare security features and functionality with other schemes. The detail showed in Table II, the proposed model can achieve the mutual authentication between devices and trusted authority. Various kinds of issues including inside attack resistance, modification attack, and replay attack resistance and so on. Hence, considering that our scheme supports more security properties and suitable for IoT communication systems based on ESP8266.

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