Research on control takeover techniques for counter-UAV (Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle)

Abstract

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become increasingly integral in both civilian and military 
domains due to their flexibility, cost-effectiveness, and mission endurance. However, this widespread 
adoption introduces complex security challenges, especially in terms of managing and preventing 
unauthorized UAV activities. Among the emerging counter-UAV techniques, hijacking UAVs by 
exploiting control protocol vulnerabilities is considered a promising and cost-efficient approach, 
particularly for research and defense applications. This paper presents technical findings related 
to hijacking-based countermeasures against UAVs by targeting the MAVLink protocol - a widely 
adopted lightweight communication protocol for UAV command and telemetry. The research outlines the architecture of UAV control systems, identifies protocol vulnerabilities and demonstrates how 
spoofed control packets can lead to full UAV takeover. The results show that, due to the lack of 
encryption and authentication in MAVLink 1.0, an attacker can successfully disrupt and override 
mission commands, effectively hijacking UAVs. This virtual simulation provides a valuable resource 
for education, training, and further research on UAV cybersecurity, particularly in environments 
where access to real UAV systems and field conditions is limited. The study emphasizes the importance 
of protocol security in UAV systems and opens new directions for proactive defense strategies.